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SUMMARY
     In this thesis, I aim to show that narrative identity, the conception of the self as a 
locus of various narrative strands, can meet key contemporary demands made on 
practical identity. However, accounts of narrative identity compete with dominant 
will-centric accounts of identity, exemplified by Christine Korsgaard’s account of 
moral identity. The purported necessity, universality, and also the historical ubiquity, 
of Korsgaard’s moral identity critically  restrict the scope for narrative identities to be 
valuable practical identities. I therefore makes two claims. First, I make the negative 
claim that there is no practical identity  which we must necessarily have. Second, I 
make the positive claim that narrative identity  is a good account of practical identity 
for today.
     In the prologue, I begin by discussing how we construct accounts of events and 
how our modes of construction frame our accounts. I continue with a discussion of the 
features of one mode of accounting - plotting. I then define a narrative as the 
collection of various plots into a single meaningful whole. I conclude the prologue by 
suggesting that seeing identity to involve narratives can give us insights into our 
practical selves. However, to do so, we need to first free our understanding of 
practical identity from the dominating grip of will-centric accounts. With that, I put 
aside my account of narratives to return to it later, and turn to undermining will-
centric accounts.
     In Chapter 1, I distinguish three ways of accounting for identity - agential, 
personal and practical - and show that  these accounts can be considered independent 
of each other. Doing so allows my  later discussion of narrative identity as practical 
identity to be unencumbered by  concerns of agential and personal identity. Here, I 
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examine Harry Frankfurt’s concept of the person using my taxonomy in order to 
demonstrate the taxonomy’s value.
     In Chapter 2, I look at Korsgaard’s will-centric moral identity as a practical 
identity, and show it to be conceptually neither necessary nor governing. Then, 
contrasting it  with Henry Rosemont’s role-centric ethics, I show that it is also not 
practically necessary, though from a will-centric worldview, it might appear that way.
     In Chapter 3, I look at the genealogy of the will-centric worldview to consider its 
lingering appeal. I compare two different genealogies by Korsgaard and Charles 
Taylor, showing how different genealogies emphasis and hide different features. I 
suggest that it  is more appropriate to see practical identity as reacting to particular 
situated demands than responding to some abstract general requirement; and with 
that, will-centric models are less appealing.
     In Chapter 4, I finally  return to narratives and suggest narrative identity, built  upon 
the features previously discussed, to respond especially well to the urgent modern 
demands of plurality and creativity. It is thus plausibly a more attractive model of 
identity than will-centric models that are less well-equipped to do so.
     In the epilogue, I end by discussing the development of my narrative account.
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PROLOGUE
PUTTING TOGETHER AN ACCOUNT OF NARRATIVES 
(SETTING UP THE STAGE FOR A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF IDENTITY)
The Beginning, the Middle and the Ending
     I begin this account at the beginning, but also in medias res. Both of these are, in 
some sense, necessarily  the case. For it is a tautology that we begin an account at the 
beginning of the account. And, hopefully, by this thesis’ end, you will see that we are 
always, in a different sense, necessarily  in the account’s middle. I will talk more about 
that sense in the chapter that  ends this thesis. Now, there is a sense in which we need 
not begin at the beginning. This is the sense that I need not start at this particular 
beginning in commencing my account. To give an example, this thesis is a thesis 
about narrative identity. Given that, I may choose to begin with a discussion about 
identity. Instead, I have chosen to begin with a discussion of beginnings, middles and 
endings. it is the case that wherever I choose to begin my account becomes, by 
definition, the beginning, it  is also the case that I may choose to begin at a different 
starting point.  It is in this sense that a beginning is not necessary. 
     So there is no necessary or natural point at  which we begin an account. We can, for 
example, begin in medias res as I am doing; choosing to begin accounting for a 
modern practical identity  not with the problems faced by  such identities, but instead 
with an examination of narrative features and the hint of my eventual solution being 
narrative accounting. But the choice of a start-point determines the shape of what 
follows. Beginning in medias res, I will still need to eventually get to the problems of 
identity  and also my fuller solution. Yet, my doing so is not just a matter of re-
assembling the structure of the account  in an interesting way. My beginning without a 
clear solution allows the solution to emerge through the work rather than having the 
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work justify  a ready-made solution; while beginning without a fully-stated problem to 
be solved also has the problem develop alongside the solution, rather than illusorily 
pre-existing it.
     Since a beginning affects the substance of what follows, choosing what with and 
how to begin an account is also important and so is not necessarily  arbitrary. For 
example, my choosing to begin with an account of narrative features is deliberate. 
Firstly, it highlights the open-ended nature of accounting right from the start as 
discussing narrative features can lead on to different topics other than narrative 
identity. Secondly, writing in a self-referential manner highlights the contrived quality 
of accounting and self-accounting. Finally, beginning with accounting rather than the 
self is deliberate because instead of making accounting a way  of talking about ‘the 
self’, I want to make ‘the self’ emerge through ways of accounting. So, I begin with 
accounting, and of narratives as a mode of accounting; for it is the mode that I will 
show to be useful for self-accounting, and the features I discuss in this prologue will 
play a major role later in the thesis.
     So it is in this sense that we must always begin in the middle. For given that there 
is no necessary point from which we begin, we must choose to begin somewhere, and 
this choosing must always be done from somewhere else - the middle. Beginning 
from a middle, the choice of a beginning point  is then motivated by  some concerns 
that we already have; including those very concerns that motivate us to give the 
account in the first place. We choose to begin an account to get us to the middles and 
endings that meet  those concerns. Consequently, the choice of a beginning point is 
never neutral or value-free, since it must always be made with some concern that we 
already have in our minds. Thus, in any account, there are beginnings and there are 
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endings, and in between the two there are also middles. In addition, when we begin 
giving any account, we must  always begin in the middle and not begin just at the 
beginning.
Plots
     There are different kinds of thing that can fill up accounts. One of those things 
would be events. There are accounts of events. There are also several ways of 
connecting up events in an account. One of those ways is plotting. A plot is an 
account of events that  has them placed in a sequential order from which the series of 
events gain coherence and meaning. Plots occur both in fiction and in actuality. That 
is to say that plots can be found to connect up either actual or fictional events. The 
only difference between the two is that events of a fictional plot are wholly generated 
from the imaginations of the fictions’ authors, while actual events are not wholly 
generated from such imaginations. However, plotting as I describe it  refers not to the 
kinds of events that are being connected up, whether fictional or actual, but rather to a 
method of accounting that is used to connect up these events that places them in a 
meaning-generating sequence.
     A series of events put together may not come together as a plot. For they may be 
put together in no meaningful or coherent fashion. They may, for example, merely be 
a series of random and unconnected events, and such a bundle of events would not be 
a plot. So “Alice biting carrots, Denise eating figs, Gary having insights” would not 
be a plot. Alternatively, there may be a series of connected events, but the manner in 
which these events are connected may still not generate meaning or coherence. A 
series of events may share the same property - perhaps they are all different sequential 
instances of Alice biting carrots, or perhaps every subsequent word capturing the 
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events are in an alphabetical sequence (see earlier example). Yet, without resultant 
meaning or coherence emerging from the connection of these events, they would still 
not be a plot. It is the emergence of meaning and coherence through the sequencing of 
events that makes a plot what it is.
     Plots are meaningfully coherent accounts in their having a certain sequential 
causality  with regards to the events that occur from the beginning event to the end 
event. In other words, Event C follows from Event B, which in turn follows from 
Event A. To use an example from E.M. Forster, “the queen died and the king died” is 
not a plot. However, “the queen died and the king died of grief” is a plot (Aspects of 
the Novel, 87). The first  two events are not yet related by some kind of causal 
explanation since the latter event is not yet explained by the former. The king could 
have been hit by a rogue arrow in battle, which would then be a wholly  different plot. 
However, the second two events are related in the sense that the former event (the 
queen dying) causally explains the latter (the king dying). The latter event is caused 
by the earlier event, hence giving rise to a meaningful and coherent understanding of 
the events.
     Plots then achieve meaning and purpose through a certain diachronic coherence. It 
is when events are put together in a certain sequence across a period of time that the 
plot’s meaning emerges. However, in order to be put together as such, the events must 
also have a kind of synchronic coherence. The set of events that occur at a particular 
time must be put together in an understandable and relevant fashion that enables and 
contributes to the latter diachronic coherence. So the queen dying and then eating 
breakfast is likely  incoherent because it is not understandable by any account. The 
queen dying and a dog sneezing at the same time is similiarly likely  incoherent 
4
because the events are likely  irrelevant to each other. I say ‘likely’ in both cases 
because the events can be made coherent  through an integration into a larger plot that 
makes relevant these events. For example, the queen’s death and dog’s sneezing 
perhaps connect and show some great cosmic order of nature.
     Now, this demand of causal connection confers upon the event-sequence a sense of 
necessity. If B is caused by  A, then necessarily if A happened in the context in which 
A happened, B follows from the occurrence of A. Given that the queen died, and that 
the king loved the queen, and that the king had a weak constitution, and that the king 
had no psychologist  on hand to counsel him, then in these circumstances, the queen’s 
death would cause the king’s death. If it could have been otherwise, where the queen 
could have died and the king not follow suit, it cannot be properly said that former 
caused the latter. But such necessity requires that the context in which the events 
occurred remains fixed. For if the context was different, then the latter event may not 
have followed from the former. So the necessity, that emerges with regards to the 
causation relation of events in a plot, emerges only  with respect to there being a 
particular context that is fixed in place.
     Yet, while within a specific plot account the events necessarily connect up, it is not 
necessary  that a single series of events be given the same plot account. For different 
events in the sequence can be given different emphases to generate different plots. In 
the above account  where the king died of grief because the queen died, the same 
events can also be given a different plot by saying that the king died of a weak 
constitution due to his poor diet and his poor health was merely exacerbated by the 
death of the queen. Or that the king died because he could not get counselling since 
the psychologist was away on holiday. The death of the queen in the given series of 
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events leading to the king’s eventual death can be given relative unimportance, and 
even be thought to be wholly incidental, depending on which plot account is given. 
This follows from a plot being an account of events and there being multiple accounts 
possible for any given series of events.
     Still, while there can be multiple possible plots for a single series of events, it  does 
not mean that all plots are equally  good, though it does mean that  it is not obvious that 
there is always only one best plot for any series of events. There may be multiple 
equally good plots about the same set of events. What makes a particular plot a good 
one is its ability to successfully serve the purposes demanded of it  by those giving or 
requesting the plot account. In other words, it  must both satisfy the standards of 
plotting demanded by those parties as well as satisfy  the purposes for which those 
parties are giving or requesting the plot. Conceptually, there is no reason to suppose 
that only one plot will satisfy these demands. However, to better understand what 
makes a plot good, we should first understand who the parties involved in plotting are 
and what motivates them to give and accept various plots, and set certain standards 
for plots.
Plotters
     There are always at least two parties to a plot account - the teller and the listener. 
A plot is an account of a series of events that is offered by a teller to a listener for a 
variety of purposes. However, while the minimum number of parties to a plot is two, 
it is possible that there are more than two parties involved in the giving and accepting 
of a plot. There may be multiple tellers and multiple listeners. Also, that there are two 
parties to a plot account does not require that  there be two distinct individuals 
involved in the plot transaction. For a single individual can play both the parts of a 
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teller and a listener and, in fact, each individual is often the first  listener of his own 
told account. Yet, the special case of telling an account to oneself does not undermine 
the fundamental transactional nature of plotting since we can still pick out two parts 
to the transaction. The transactional nature of such plotting generates the standards for 
judging a plot account.
     A feature of good plotting emerges simply from the features of communication - 
the plot must be one that can be understood by one’s listener. Thus, the plot must  be 
delivered in a manner of communication, a language, and a set of understood 
meanings that are shared between the parties telling and listening to the plot. The 
standards of a plot are partly measured by its potential successful communicability 
between the parties involved in the plot’s communication. Better plots are better 
communicable. The manner in which a plot is communicable is often set by  the 
cultures and communities that the tellers and listeners of a plot are in. In this manner, 
cultures determine the standards of a plot. Nonetheless, the measure of a plot’s value 
is its eventual communicability  between specific parties, and not its conformance to 
sets of cultural standards. For the same reasons, neither is its value linked to any 
existing global standard of communicability.
     The next feature of good plotting emerges from the feature of successful 
communication - the plot must be one that successfully communicates the teller’s 
intended effect to the listener. This need not always be that  the plot is one that is 
accepted entirely by the listener, for it  is possible for a teller of the plot to intend the 
listener to reject the plot being offered. A teller of a plot may offer an implausible plot 
with the intention that the listener rejects it on the grounds of its implausibility and if 
the listener does so, then it results in the successful communication of the plot. 
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Neither does the teller of the plot always require a very specific intended effect in his 
listener. For he could be offering a plot without any  particular purpose and would be 
happy to accept whatever the listener makes of it. In this case, any  manner in which 
the listener receives the plot from the teller would then count as a successful 
communication exercise.
     So, the demands of successful communication set standards by which we judge the 
value of a plot. For achieving the intended effect in one’s listener involves negotiating 
with that listener’s expectations and motivations in order to bring about the effect. A 
listener’s expectations and motivations therefore set the standards by which a plot is 
judged to be good. This is not to say that those expectations and motivations are fixed, 
for they can be changed. Yet, until those are changed, the existing expectations and 
motivations of a listener set the standards for the value of a plot. For example, a 
viewer may expect all comedies to follow the idiosyncratic style of comedies starring 
Woody Allen, and so fail to appreciate comedies starring Will Farrell. Yet, learning 
what to expect and consequently learning to enjoy a Will Farrell-type comedy would 
make such a comedy valuable to that  viewer, though until he learns to do it, it would 
not be so.
     In another way, the value of a plot account is in turn connected to one’s 
background cultures and communities. This is the way in which one’s background 
cultures and communities determine one’s expectations and motivations, thus setting 
the standards through which a plot is to be judged. If a person is brought up with the 
background to find Will Farrell-type comedies valuable, it is more likely that he is 
able to do so. However, it is not so that the expectations and motivations linked to a 
background culture and community are fixed and unchangeable, or that our 
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memberships in a given culture and community are always likewise fixed and 
unchangeable. Neither does this mean that it  is easy to change the expectations of 
one’s culture or that it is easy to move in and out of a community, but simply  that it 
can be done. By doing so, the expectations and motivations of a listener of a plot  can 
thus be changed.
     Neither should it  be presumed that any party  is always only restricted to one 
culture and one community. For any  party may be, and tends to be, party to several 
groups - whether to an ethnic, a national, a political, a workplace or a family culture. 
Each of these cultures carry certain background expectations and motivations and the 
combination of these, when a single party is a member of different communities and 
cultures, leads to that party being influenced by, and often adopting, the expectations 
and motivations of these different cultures. These cultures can even have conflicting 
demands, whether at different times or at  the same time, and these conflicts are then 
manifested in the party himself. There is no good reason to suppose that these 
conflicting demands can be, or need to be, integrated and resolved within a single 
party. However, the teller of a plot must negotiate between these conflicting 
expectations in the achieving of his intentions.
     A teller’s negotiation of these conflicting expectations need not be attempting to 
harmonise them with each other. For a teller may use these conflicting expectations to 
challenge one another, presenting a combination of motivations and expectations for 
the sake of contestation, sometimes even using one to overwhelm and remove another 
conflicting expectation. Thus, while cultures and communities provide the resources 
and requirements for plot-telling, they also provide the resources to challenge the 
value of a given plot by providing plots with the resources to challenge other cultural 
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expectations. So cultures constrain the kinds of plots that can be given, since the 
parties involved may have their understanding and endorsement influenced by 
cultures. However, cultures also give us the grounds for challenging those constraints 
by harnessing the force of certain motivations and expectations that are found in 
them.
     Any observer of a series of events may offer or contest  a plot connecting those 
events and so be a party to the telling and listening of the plot. The observer of the 
plot may or may not be parties themselves involved in the plot. A foreigner observing 
the king’s death after the queen’s might offer the account that the queen’s death 
caused the king grief and death. The king himself may offer the plot that the queen’s 
death caused him grief and hence his eventual death (though obviously, this account 
would be given by the king’s ghost). Yet, despite the possibility of many tellers, the 
success of a plot would depend upon the expectations and motivations of the eventual 
listener of the plot. The foreigner who tells the king that he will die of joy  when the 
queen dies would not at all cohere with the expectations of the king if the king loves 
the queen, and that  particular plot being offered to the king would not be a successful 
one.
The Web of Plots
     However, the prospect of multiple tellers and multiple listeners all with different 
agendas allow for a multiplicity  of perspectives involved in plotting a single series of 
events. What this then leads us to is the possibility of multiple plots about the same 
event - some in contestation, some not. We need not supposed that all tellers of plots 
are motivated by the same concerns in giving their account. Each teller of the plot 
comes with his own motivations and offer different accounts that may or may not 
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need to be unified in dialogue with each others’ accounts. Neither should we suppose 
that tellers of plots are always aiming to give one comprehensive and totalising plot at 
any one time. For each plot given may be responding to very different questions 
involved, and the teller of a plot may be, and tends to be, ambivalent about whether or 
not his given account coheres universally  with all other good accounts. This then 
leads us to a complex web of plots.
     We can have different plots about a series of events in different ways. To begin 
with, they may be focussed on different features of the same set of events. For 
example, we can look at the kinds of relations involved. To those interested in 
political effects, it  may be useful to see it as a plot of the queen dying and the king 
dying of grief. Yet, to their young son, the prince, it  may just be a case of his mother 
dying and his father dying of grief. To a doctor, it may simply be the case of a 
traumatic incident for a certain human being causing a heart seizure in him that then 
ultimately  led to that person’s death. In all these cases, the same events are recounted 
in different ways. By focussing on the different aspects of the same set of events, we 
can generate different plots since a different configuration would give the events in 
the plot a different flavour and have those events serve a different explanatory 
function.
    Choosing to make central to the plot one particular event rather than another in a 
given series of events would also generate a different plot involving the same series of 
events. If the death of the king were the central focus of the plot, it gives special 
significance to the cause of his death, specifically the death of the queen. We then 
become interested in the closeness of the relationship between the king and the queen 
in order to see precisely  how the queen’s death could have led to the king’s death 
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from grief. However, if the focus of the plot is the instability  of the country in a 
political vacuum after the death of the king, such as if the focus were on the 
succession dispute that results from his passing, then we are merely interested in 
whether the king died of natural causes or was assassinated by  one of his successors. 
The queen’s death takes on a lesser significance and the depth of their relationship of 
no significance at all.
     We can also attribute different understandings to the series of events and, in doing 
so, give the events in the series a different significance. For though the king’s death 
follows from the queen’s death, and we admit that the king’s death was caused by the 
queen’s death, we can connect the events in different ways. We can claim that the 
queen’s death either caused the king mere sadness or traumatic grief. If the latter, then 
it might be said to be the chief cause of the king’s death. If the former, then it is seen 
to be one of many, and perhaps only a minor one amongst many, causes that led to the 
king’s death. Even if a series of events follow from each other in some causal fashion, 
the nature and extent  of the causal force the former event has on the latter event 
remains underdetermined. As such, different plots can still be offered in this manner 
about the same series of events by attributing a different significance to the same 
causal factor.
     Given that points of beginnings and endings are not necessarily  determined in the 
giving of an account, as was asserted at the start  of this prologue, there is yet another 
possibility for there to be different plots about the same series of events. For we can 
choose to begin and end at a different point. We can take the beginning of the plot to 
be the death of the queen leading to the subsequent death of the king from grief. 
However, we can connect this up in a larger plot of the queen having died from 
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grieving the death of the queen mother which only then goes on to lead to the king’s 
death, making it into a different plot altogether. On the other hand, we can begin with 
the death of the king from a heart attack, leading to future events such as a succession 
struggle in the kingdom. So, the non-necessity of beginning or ending a plot account 
at any particular point means that there are a web of plots made possible by any  series 
of events.
     So with regards to any series of events, there are different plots that can be offered. 
There may exist  a plot that capture all these different plots - a megaplot. Such a plot 
would be one where all possible plots come together in a harmonious manner. I doubt 
that such a plot is possible for any set of events because, as shown above, the events 
of a plot underdetermine how a plot can be told by  allowing a different focus and 
different significance to different events. And, such underdetermination enables the 
giving of conflicting plots that prevent harmonious coherence. While the king of 
Freedonia and the father of Charles dying may  be compatible accounts that cohere in 
a larger account, whether the queen’s death was a major or a minor cause of the king’s 
death, for example, are exclusive explanations that refuse to be coherently put 
together in a single account. Given that both these accounts are plausible ones that 
may be good ones, a mega-plot is not possible.
     Furthermore, I see no reason why any teller of a plot must be interested in a mega-
plot or having their plots cohere with a mega-plot. For if tellers of a plot measure their 
success in terms of whether or not the plot brings about its intended effect in the 
listener, there is no reason why the teller of a plot might be interested in having their 
plot cohere in a mega-plot. This is only if the listener requires such a mega-plot, and 
there are no good reason why we might think a listener would always want to make 
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such a demand. It seems more sensible that tellers give plot accounts for particular 
purposes, like in the cases of political explanation or familial explanation suggested 
above, and listeners listen to these accounts for particular purposes as well. A mega-
plot, while not necessarily  contradicting such purposes, would be superfluous and 
introduces irrelevant plot-strands into the explanation that is given for a very 
particular purpose. 
Plots and Futures
     So far, I have only  talked of plots as though they were ways of putting together 
past events in order to develop some kind of causal explanation about those events. 
Yet, plots need not only  involve past events that have already happened but also 
future events that we expect to happen. What is involved in a plot is the providing of a 
meaningfully coherent account of a series of events regardless of whether they have 
happened yet or not. Given that there is a causal force to a plot structure, evident in an 
event’s happening in the distant past  being seen to bring about another event in the 
nearer past, so an event happening in the present can be taken to follow the same plot 
structure and bring about a future event in line with that same plot structure. The 
expectations and motivations of teller and listener to see the events follow such a 
structure generate the necessary causal force of a plot, and with these a plot can 
include future events.
     In fact, one key motivation for telling a plot is to understand and motivate future 
events. Just as plots consist of a series of necessary causalities between events, future 
events can be said to be caused by events that have already  happened. The plot that 
we choose to tell therefore would give rise to the events that follow. We therefore give 
accounts of past events in order to predict or motivate future events for action, 
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choosing the narrative strand that would in turn give rise to the future events that we 
wish to occur. So given all that we know about the king’s devotion to the queen, the 
king’s poor physical health, the king’s tendency  to slip into bouts of depression and so 
on, we would expect that queen’s death to bring about the king’s death. We would 
expect this to occur even if the event of the queen’s death has not yet come about, and 
expect it to occur because it  would be coherent with that plot structure in causally 
following from that previous event.
Narratives - Partly Stipulating a Definition
     I have presented a manner in which we can give explanatory accounts of human 
actions. This mode of explanation assumes that there is a beginning, a middle and an 
end in a sequential order of events. There is a succession of relevant events in and 
over time. It assumes that such a manner of sequencing generates a kind of 
meaningful coherence where earlier events are seen to cause future events. It assumes 
that this account is one that is given from one party  to another with the intention of 
achieving some purpose on the part  of the teller, and aims to achieve that purpose 
based on an understanding of the motivations and expectations of the listener. It  also 
assumes that such an account allows for a multiplicity  of such accounts as each 
account is incomplete. Finally, it is an account that can connect up not only past 
events, but also future events. I call this account a plot. I further stipulate that the 
collection of various plots in a single meaningful whole is a narrative.
     My accounts of both plots and narratives are stipulated in that they should not be 
taken as uncontroversial essential definitions. It  is, I think, impossible to give an 
essential account of either term because they are both forms of accounting, and ones 
whose defining features have changed over time. In fact, they have changed precisely, 
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at times, as a challenge to their so-called definitions. For example, it  might  be that  a 
plot involves a single action through its course of events, as perhaps suggested of 
tragic plots by Aristotle in the Poetics. Yet is it partly  in a direct challenge to this that 
Laurence Sterne wrote Tristram Shandy to arguably  create a plot with multiple strands 
of action. Or it might be suggested that a plot  be centred around a set of key 
characters. Yet, this is once again deliberately  contradicted by Roberto Bolaño in 
2666. Giving an essential definition of a form of accounting is akin to waving a red 
flag and inviting a challenge to show its insufficiency.
     However, neither are my  accounts wholly  stipulated definitions of either plot or 
narrative. It is built, in part, on existing theories about plots and narrative, notably  on 
Forster’s discussion in Aspects of the Novel. Furthermore, I think that it coheres with 
features that we recognise to be key features of the narrative today. The definitions 
that I offer therefore loosely  match up to what we consider aspects of the narrative 
today, though they do not give us absolutely  necessary nor wholly sufficient 
conditions for capturing all forms of narratives. In carefully selecting and highlighting 
precisely these features of accounting found in narratives today, I am giving an 
account of narratives that will serve my own purpose in this thesis - to provide a mode 
of accounting that I believe to be most useful in explaining aspects of our identity 
today. In other words, I wish to generate an identity  centrally built  upon the mode of 
accounting I have described, what I will call narrative identity.
     It is attractive, in my view, to re-conceive of the way in which we think about 
identity  due to certain practical demands we want to meet today. Chiefly, it is the 
demand to take seriously and centrally  a plurality of different ethical sources of value. 
There is also a more specific demand that we be maximally  responsive to creativity 
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and fun as value sources. As narrative identity meets these demands, there is a place 
for conceiving of identity  with a new central focus on narration. However, a chief 
obstacle to my re-conception must be confronted - the  purported necessity of moral 
identity. Christine Korsgaard claims moral identity  to be a governing source of 
normativity that constrains other ethical sources. It  is only by rejecting its necessity 
that the space opens up for a rich narrative identity. Rejecting its necessity is thus 
what I turn to in the next three chapters before I return to discuss what narrative 




(THREE DOMINANT WAYS OF DOING SO)
     Different ways of accounting for identity  give us different accounts of selves. This 
has already been demonstrated by other philosophers such as David Velleman and 
Amelie Rorty. However, I do not borrow or extend their different accounts of identity 
as their distinct modes of dividing up different aspects of the self do not serve my 
purposes. That is to say  that either the manner in which they generate different 
accounts of selves closes off the space that  I require for my purposes or that their own 
variety of accounts do not yield the most effective manner through which I can 
achieve my goals. My  manner of accounting for identity therefore splits up accounts 
of identity  in an idiosyncratic way, though each specific way of accounting borrows 
heavily from existing philosophical literature. (For a comparison with some other 
ways of distinguishing between a variety  of accounts of identity, see my discussion in 
Appendix A).
     In this chapter, I do two things. First, I define three ways of accounting for the self 
that generate three kinds of self-identities. I do this because separating out the three 
kinds of identity-claims will later enable me to achieve my aims both of rejecting the 
necessity of moral identity in a relevant way, that is to say as a practical identity, and 
also of opening up the space for a practical account of narrative identity. Second, 
having defined the three kinds of identity accounts, I then apply them to an existing 
philosophical account of identity, namely Harry Frankfurt’s account of identity, in 
order to both clarify my distinctions as well as demonstrate the usefulness of my 
proposed taxonomy in carrying out such analyses. I will show that certain criticisms 
of his account of identity will emerge from the manner in which I make distinctions, 
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and that having made these distinctions, we can then think of each of the three modes 
of identity-accounting independently from each other.
Three Ways of Accounting for Identity
     We can divide the ways we account for identity according to different questions we 
want to answer. For we have different concerns with regards to our capacity to act 
meaningfully. These distinct ways demand different configurations of identity. There 
are at least three such questions: “how do I act?”, “who am I that acts?”, and “how 
should I act?”  The I answering to these three different questions do not necessarily all 
correspond to the same set of features and I do not think that there is good reason to 
expect that they do so. In accordance, as far as possible, with existing philosophical 
terms of art, I refer to the account of selfhood each of these three questions yield as 
the agential account of identity, the personal account of identity and the practical 
account of identity respectively. For convenience, I shall refer to them as (i) agential 
identity, (ii) personal identity and (iii) practical identity though, rightfully, they are not 
kinds of identities but kinds of accounts.
     I must first highlight a general point - the I in each of these different accounts of 
identity is not exclusively self-reflexive. It is not necessary that identity is conceived 
of through a first-personal mode, in any of the three kinds of accounts of identity. The 
same question can be asked in the second-personal and third-personal forms - “how 
do you act?”, “who are you that acts?”, and “how should you act?”  as well as “how 
does he act?”, “who is he that acts?”, and “how should he act?”  respectively. Unless 
stated otherwise, I thus use the terms “I”  and “self”  in such an inclusive and broad 
manner. So when I use a term like “self-conception”, I do not mean the manner in 
which a first-personal self conceives of himself, but broadly as a conception of the 
self as possibly understood from all the first, second and third personal perspectives. 
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This inclusive understanding of selfhood has philosophical implications that will be 
made clear later.
     (i) Agential identity refers to the accounts of identity pertaining to the question 
“how do I act?”  It is an account of one’s self in terms of the mechanisms that enable 
one to be motivated to act and to then actually act. It is thus concerned with what 
enables one to be an actor - what it means to perform an action voluntarily and of 
one’s own free will.  Note that what it means for us to bring about such actions is not 
to merely see how actions occur as a result of mechanisms in us, but to actually 
identify oneself with those mechanisms and their resultant outcome. Various answers 
have been proposed as to how to best understand the mechanisms that bring about our 
actions. For example, one answer is to suggest that we have a free will that reflexively 
decides what actions to carry out and then, by willing the execution of those actions, 
brings about those actions though a command of various motivating mechanisms, 
such as our passions and our instrumental reasoning.
    One example of agential identity can be put together by considering David Hume’s 
account of action. Hume notes that we have impressions of various pleasures and 
pains in our souls or bodies that generate impressions of violent emotions that he calls 
passions. These determine the will and brings it to carry out actions. In carrying out 
actions, our will endorses both the actions performed and the passions motivating the 
action. In this account of action, Hume denies that reason has itself any motivating 
force, though it can inform the manner in which a will achieves the goal set by our 
passions (A Treatise of Human Nature, II, i, 1 and II, iii, 3). Here, Hume provides an 
account of agency - of the execution of actions by a person, but not yet an account of 
agential identity - of the person that executes these actions. Nonetheless, from what he 
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gives, we can develop an appropriate account of agential identity where such a self 
consists of endorsed driving passions.
     (ii) Personal identity, unfortunately so generically named, refers to accounts of 
identity pertaining to the question “who am I that is acting?”  or “what makes me this 
being rather than that being at a certain place or time”. Personal identity is concerned 
with issues of identifying oneself and re-identifying oneself for the sake of attributing 
actions to that self.  We are interested in doing so because we are concerned about 
picking out the person who performs an action, for example for the purpose of 
identifying a person in a court of law and attributing responsibility for having carried 
out that action. Various answers have been proposed as to what the features that pick 
out personal identity are. For example, one solution is to suggest that the links are 
psychological and that what makes a person that person is the existence of relevant 
psychological linkages such as memories, intentions, goals, belief, desires or 
character traits.
    An influential example of personal identity is found in John Locke’s works, when 
he asks us to imagine the soul of a prince deserting his princely body and carrying 
with him all the consciousness of the prince’s past life into the body of a cobbler. 
Locke then claims that the princely soul in the cobbler’s body is personally identical 
to the soul that was in the princely body before. Locke argues that the being in both 
bodies, the prince and the cobbler’s, is the same self, to which he gives what he calls 
the forensic term of “person”. The term is forensic in that it is only given to beings 
that we can charge with being the bearers of actions that are appropriately judged as 
blameworthy or praiseworthy. The focus of the enterprise is to pick out the same 
being that actions can then be properly imputed to. It is then about what features are 
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possessed by this being that make it the one we see as the correct actor to which we 
attribute an action (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, I, xxvii, 9-29).
     (iii) Practical identity refers to accounts of identity pertaining to the question “how 
should I act?”  These are complex accounts of selves as meaningful beings that exist 
for various purposes and act for the sake of those purposes. Practical identity is the 
configuration of characteristics under which we recognise ourselves and value 
ourselves when we attempt to carry out certain meaningful actions and bring about 
certain meaningful events. It is the set of features that we value in ourselves and 
which are taken into consideration, whether consciously or unconsciously, when 
acting. It is an account of ourselves that enables us to act in a recognisably coherent 
fashion, and so to act without regard to our practical identity is to shatter some 
coherence of our lives and to render ourselves less meaningfully recognisable to 
ourselves. I shall spend more time expounding on practical identity, since it is the 
mode of self-accounting that is centrally discussed in this thesis.
     Though he intended it to refer to a general conception of identity, Charles Taylor 
gives a very good definition of what I specifically call practical identity in writing that 
“my identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the 
frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, 
or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose. In other words, it 
is the horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand.... [For people], were they 
to lose this commitment or identification, they would be at sea, as it were; they 
wouldn’t know anymore, for an important range of questions, what the significance of 
things was for them” (Sources of the Self, 27). Practical identity is then the way in 
which we identify ourselves such that we become significant beings to ourselves. 
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Importantly, it is our practical identities that give us reasons for acting in particular 
ways such that we are coherent beings.
     I should, however, point out a crucial difference between my own account of 
practical identity and Taylor’s account of identity. As previously stated, practical 
identity is not necessarily a self-reflexive relation. While Taylor does not explicitly 
claim that his account of identity is a wholly self-reflexive one, he gives no 
conclusions to the contrary and his account, along with the conclusions he draws from 
his account, are most naturally read as though he intended his account of identity as 
being strongly self-reflexive. In contrast, when I write that practical identity 
comprises of a set of features under which we recognise our selves and value our 
selves, I do not mean this strictly in the sense of us being engaged in a purely self-
regarding activity where each individual person looks upon and recognises his own 
unique person. Rather, I mean it inclusively - that another person can recognise me as 
having a certain practical identity as well.
     There are numerous ways of generating a practical identity as we identify our 
selves with sets of different things. One set of things that can fulfill the role of a 
practical identity would be a set of social roles - being a father, a student, a worker, a 
political ruler or a political subject. Acting in light of such roles gives our actions 
meaning. My writing of a thesis only gains meaning in light of my role as a student. 
Otherwise, I am a man putting words on paper meaninglessly, or at least without that 
particular social meaning granted by my student identity. Likewise, my voting in the 
Singapore elections only gains meaning in light of my role as a Singapore citizen. 
Identifying myself, or being identified by others, with a series of different roles is one 
way of generating a robust practical identity from which I exist and act with purpose 
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and value. It is the way in which I see myself, and am seen by others, as a creature of 
significance.
Reading Frankfurt’s Account of Identity as Three Accounts of Identity
     Thus far, I have been writing in a broad schematic manner, defining the 
distinctions between different accounts of selfhood. Now, I shall examine a single 
account of identity - Harry Frankfurt’s account. Frankfurt’s single account can serve 
as an account for all the three distinct ways of accounting that I have defined by 
answering all three ethical questions asked - “how do we act?”, “who are we that 
acts?” and “how should we act?” Thus, it  is an especially useful account to 
demonstrate the distinctions I make as well as show how these distinctions allow a 
good critique of existing accounts of identity. I shall analyse Frankfurt’s account first 
in terms of (i) agential identity, then (ii) personal identity, and (iii) practical identity. I 
begin with agential identity because his account is most successfully  such an account. 
In contrast, he gives us an incomplete account of personal identity, and an 
unsatisfying account of practical identity.
    (i) Frankfurt’s account of identity is put together by considering the mechanisms 
and processes through which persons act and is thus, in the first instance, an account 
of agential identity. He begins by looking for essential differences between non-
persons and persons, and finds one in a person’s volitional structure - a person has 
higher-order desires and volitions which then let him will freely (“Freedom of the 
Will”, henceforth “FW”, 12-9). Like non-person actors, we find desires already 
present in us, with some desires being more fundamental. However, persons are also 
reflective beings that direct themselves in line with their wills. Reflecting and taking 
our selves seriously make us want to develop synchronically and diachronically 
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coherent selves, and this higher-order desire motivates us to harmonise our desires. 
Frankfurt thus offers us an account of how we act by reflectively endorsing some of 
our driving desires and resultant actions. He tells us how we are free. 
    To elaborate, Frankfurt’s concept of the person is that of a being possessing a 
certain volitional structure - a person has a will that can be free in the sense of being 
able to identify with and act in line with certain features he finds in himself. Frankfurt 
gives us an account of a being with a reflective consciousness that is able to think 
about itself. It is thus able to see itself as a bearer of certain desires and other 
processes. It is also able to have second-order desires about those first-order desires/
processes, that is to say that it can have a desire to want to have or not to have a 
certain first-order desire/processes. It is also able to have second-order volitions, that 
is to say that it can have a desire to want a certain desire/process to be his will. A 
person is thus a being that can reflectively identify with certain processes that it finds 
within itself. Acting in line with these makes his actions a free action for he is acting 
in line with his will (“FW” 11-25). 
     The will is not the originator of these motivations and processes but only 
reflectively endorses and identifies itself with these processes that it already finds 
within its person. A person is the being that is able to reflectively identify with such 
processes found within itself and be motivated to act in line with them. So Frankfurt 
writes, “willing acceptance of attitudes, thoughts and feelings transforms their 
status.... We have taken responsibility for them as authentic expressions of 
ourselves.... When they move us, we are therefore not passive. We are active, because 
we are being moved just by ourselves (Taking Ourselves Seriously, henchforth TOS, 
8, author’s emphasis). So, being a person involves the ability to take responsibility for 
certain expressions of ourselves by identifying ourselves with those expressions. 
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Frankfurt therefore gives us agential identity - we act according to desires found in 
our person, and they are our actions because we identify ourselves with them.
     (ii) Frankfurt’s account can also be taken as an account of personal identity. This 
might have been what he intended in offering his account as an alternative to Peter 
Strawson’s type of account of personhood, best read as one of personal identity 
(“FW”, 11). Strawson defines a person as a single individual of a single type to which 
it is applicable to ascribe both states of consciousness and corporeal characteristics. 
Frankfurt contends that such accounts are mistaken as they do not capture what is 
unique about persons, being also appropriately applied to non-persons. In its place, he 
offers his account instead. If so, then a Frankfurtian reply to “what are we that acts?” 
is simply that of a being possessing the above-stated volitional structure. As the 
Strawsonian account is largely an account of personal identity, answering “what 
makes me this individual, rather than a kind of individual in general”, Frankfurt’s 
account must do this if taken as a personal identity account.
     (iii) The Frankfurt account can be, has been, developed further to become an 
account of practical identity. The title of his Tanner Lecture is Taking Ourselves 
Seriously and Getting It Right, where the focus of getting things right is a question of 
how we should value. A chapter in his book The Reasons of Love (henchforth RL) is 
titled “The Question: How Should We Live?”, explicitly asking the question of 
practical identity. Frankfurt therefore gives an account of practical identity in his 
overall presentation of selfhood. For Frankfurt, the answer to what we should value is 
given as what we already necessarily do value in our wills. We should value the things 
we already most care about, for it is those things that give our lives meaning and 
coherence. The only further suggestion by Frankfurt about our values is that we may 
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be inclined to try to harmonise our volitions, otherwise their conflict might render us 
incapable of action.
     To elaborate, Frankfurt first notes that identifying oneself with some desires rather 
than others is not arbitrary. For it is done after a person has reflected upon all those 
processes within himself and, finding no greater motivation to think or do otherwise, 
decisively commits to a given set of processes by identifying himself with that set of 
processes. Such an endorsement is not arbitrary because there is a reason why it is 
achieved - the person has no reason to continue deliberating. Frankfurt gives the 
analogy of arithmetic calculation. Arriving at the answer, the person performing the 
calculation has no reason to continue calculating unless he has a reason to think that 
he might be wrong. While he may still be mistaken about the answer, his terminating 
the calculation process at this point nonetheless cannot be said to be done arbitrarily. 
For he has done the process of deliberation and finds no further motivation to 
conclude otherwise (“Identification and Wholeheartedness”, 159-176).
     We consequently deliberate and form volitions. There is a further way of dividing 
these volitions into two different kinds - volitions that aim only for synchronic 
endorsement and volitions that aim for diachronic endorsement. In other words, there 
are desires that we want to currently identify with our will, and there are desires that 
we not only want to currently identify with our will, but also to continue to identify 
with our will. This second kind of volition, Frankfurt calls caring. It is because we 
care about things that certain things become important to us. It is because we are 
motivated by the things that we care about, and motivated in wanting to continue to 
be motivated by them, that we successively design our selves over time so our wills 
will continue to care about those things (TOS, 18-9). It is through caring that we find 
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significance in our actions because it is only by caring that things become important 
to us.
     Of the things that we do care about, there are things that we care about as 
instrumental ends for the accomplishment of some further purpose, and things that we 
care about as final ends in their own right. The things that we care about in their own 
right are provided and legitimated by what Frankfurt calls love (TOS, 26). Love, as 
defined by Frankfurt, is an involuntary, nonutilitarian, rigidly-focused and self-
affirming concern for the existence and the good of what is loved. A lover identifies 
himself with the beloved and the beloved’s interests. And a lover cannot help but love 
what he loves, and cannot help but be motivated to act to benefit his beloved (TOS, 
40-2). In this way, love involves what Frankfurt calls volitional necessities - it is 
something that is not in our voluntary control to determine whether or not to care for 
them (TOS, 24). It is only because of these fundamental final ends that we find things 
to have importance.
    Because we take things to be important, we want to make sure that we deliberate 
correctly. For deliberations determine how we act, and we want to act in line with 
what we think is important. Frankfurt writes that “taking ourselves seriously means 
that we are not prepared to accept ourselves just as we come. We want our thoughts, 
our feelings, our behavior to make sense. We are not satisfied to think that our ideas 
are formed haphazardly, or that our actions are driven by transient and opaque 
impulses or by mindless decisions. We need to direct ourselves - or at any rate to 
believe that we are directing ourselves - in thoughtful conformity to stable and 
appropriate norms. We want to get things right”  (TOS, 2, author’s emphasis). Like a 
person doing an arithmetic calculation, we want to make sure that our method of 
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calculation is correct and that our calculated answer is correct. We take ourselves 
seriously and want to get things right.
     Yet, for Frankfurt, getting things right is just getting the facts right. He writes, 
“once we have learned as much as possible about the natural characteristics of the 
things we care about, and as much as possible about ourselves, there are no further 
substantive corrections that can be made. There is really nothing else to look for so far 
as the normativity of final ends is concerned. There is nothing else to get right”  (TOS, 
50). We only make corrections to our views for two reasons. Firstly, it is to eradicate 
conflict amongst the things we love, for by getting a better understanding of them, we 
can determine which one we love more. Secondly, it is to make sure that we are not 
mistaken about the things we love. For example, I love whisky and so love the glass 
of whisky in front of me. But, the glass may be filled with petrol and so my love of 
that glass of whisky might be misdirected. Yet, once I am correct about the fact of 
things, there is nothing more to get right.
     Frankfurt goes so far as to say that there is nothing that is inherently important, but 
that things only gain importance because we care about them (TOS, 33-4). We care 
about them because we cannot help but care about something. So he writes that “our 
interest in living does not commonly depend upon our having projects that we desire 
to pursue. It’s the other way around: we are interested in having worthwhile projects 
to pursue because we do intend to go on living, and we would prefer not to be 
bored”  (TOS, 36-7). It is because we want to go on living and in living we would 
prefer not to be bored that we then find things important. In this way, life, and the 
other things that we love, generate value for us. There is no other source of value for 
us other than those generated by our own wills and our volitional necessities. Hence, 
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Frankfurt’s volitional account of the person tells us “how should we act?”  and gives 
us a practical identity account as well.
Analysing Frankfurt’s Account in Terms of the Three Ways of Accounting
     I will not analyse Frankfurt’s account in terms of (i) agential identity as I think it  is 
a good account. However, if it is to be an account of (ii) personal identity, then it must 
be able to identify and re-identify persons and, on the basis of this identification, be 
able to properly ascribe actions to that person. Frankfurt’s account cannot do this. To 
begin with, the components of Frankfurt’s volitional structure do not appear to be 
sufficiently stable enough to allow for such an identification in line with our 
intuitions. In his model, we identify ourselves with a reflectively endorsed attitude, 
thought or action. It is the case that we need not always reflectively endorse the same 
attitudes, thoughts and actions at different times. If these endorsements are largely 
changed, then, by his model, we would be considered a different person altogether. 
Yet, we normally think that a person can endorse things differently without becoming 
a different person. As such, the account is unintuitive.
    More importantly, Frankfurt’s account must already presuppose some other account 
of personal identity. For Frankfurt does take the boundaries of action to be within our 
own persons. In doing so, he must already presuppose that there is a way of 
distinguishing between desires in ourselves and in other persons. Given that we can 
influence the world around us and other persons, and extend our agency in that way, 
there is no reason why we cannot endorse and motivate any desire in the world. If 
Frankfurt’s account refers to any desire we can influence and endorse, then it would 
include a lot more desires than those we would think of as being ours. However, 
Frankfurt rightfully does not seem to want to do that. It would be odd to have an 
account of personhood that extended over anything we could control and motivate. So 
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Frankfurt’s own account depends on a further account of personal identity to bound 
his own. It is thus incomplete as an account of personal identity.
     What, I think, leads to the confusion is the idea that an account of personal identity 
matters because we are finding the person that we can hold responsible for actions, 
that is to say the person to which we can attribute praiseworthy and blameworthy 
actions. From here, Frankfurt requires a fairly controversial assumption that actions 
are praiseworthy and blameworthy only if they are done out of one’s free will. Hence, 
these become, for Frankfurt, the only actions that count as coming from a person and 
so identifying a person. Yet, this move is surely illegitimate. We speak of a person’s 
actions as being free and not free, rather than taking only the set of his free actions to 
make up a person. Identifying with some of one’s desires and actions freely does not 
make one’s identity merely those desires and actions. Focussing on free will and 
agency will therefore only give us a partial account of what makes up our personal 
identity.
    For different reasons, I believe that Frankfurt also fails to give us a good account of 
(iii) practical identity. Here, the inadequacy lies in an inability to practically talk about 
the value of our values due to where he locates values - he makes values wholly 
contingent on our individual motivating desires and volitions, and the account takes 
our will and volitions as already existing in us. Furthermore, we cannot deeply affect 
or change these. So he writes that “the will is a thing as real as any reality outside us. 
The truth about it does not depend upon what we think it is, or upon what we wish it 
were”  (TOS, 49-50). We are therefore already motivated in various ways and asking 
about how we should be motivated does not change the way that we actually are 
motivated. He then takes the motivating will to be the sole source of value. There is 
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nothing to challenge each particular will with regards to what is valuable other than 
what that will already finds valuable.
     So discussions of value are all filtered through our motivations and disposition. 
However, this makes it nearly impossible to correctly talk about values. This is 
because, as Frankfurt himself agrees, “we often do not understand ourselves very 
well. It is not so easy for people to know what they really care about or what they 
truly love. Our motives and our dispositions are notoriously uncertain and opaque, 
and we often get ourselves wrong. It is hard to be sure what we can bring ourselves to 
do, or how we will behave when the chips are down”  (TOS, 49). Our motivations, and 
so our values, are not only pre-given to us, but also mysterious to us. Whatever it is 
that we truly endorse and truly identify ourselves with is unclear to us. So what we 
truly value, and in his account what is truly valuable, is similar unclear. So the value 
of asking the question “how should one act?”  in relation to these is diminished 
because we cannot know if we have gotten them right.
    One suggestion that Frankfurt does give that emerges from his account of the will 
is that we might want to try to have our volitions harmonise with one another so that 
we are not conflicted. This, for Frankfurt, is the highest form of ‘taking ourselves 
seriously’, where we love ourselves and wholeheartedly (RL, 96-8). However, 
consistent with the rest of his account, Frankfurt does not see this as a decisive value, 
even in the small number of cases where its direct concern might come into play. For 
although the volitional structure of the self is necessary for willing and caring, there is 
no necessary reason to care or value the self’s volitional structure. Frankfurt’s urging 
that we love the self is then only a suggestion, and not a decisive one. Frankfurt even 
admits that we can live with disharmony. But with the resulting prospect of having 
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our wills continually thwarted, he recommend that if we do so, we should develop a 
sense of humor and irony (RL, 100).
     Frankfurt’s answer to how we should act is then that we should act in line with the 
things we most want to do. However, given that we always do what we most want to 
do and that we are never clear as to what it is that we most want to do, Frankfurt’s 
answer to the practical question is unhelpful. When we do ask the practical question, 
we are interested in getting direction to act in one particular way rather than another. 
Frankfurt’s account of practical identity, although it does give us an answer as to what 
we should do generally, does not give us an answer as to what we should do 
particularly. Someone who is deciding between trying to watch a movie and writing a 
thesis would not be helped by being told either that he should do what he most wants 
to do or that he will do what he most wants to do. What he is looking for is an 
explanation of why something is or should be the thing he most wants to do, and 
Frankfurt’s account does not give him that.
     The confusion here lies in that an account of practical identity tries to answer how 
we  should act in line with what we find valuable and have reason to find valuable, 
and that the capability to act freely is one such valuable thing we can find. Yet given 
that there are so many ways of acting freely, that some of these ways can be 
incompatible, and that there may be values that can be obtained only by giving up 
one’s freedom, appealing to only this value and no other is often unhelpful and 
possibly wrong. Even if it is true that we cannot find anything else valuable without 
our reflexive volitional structures, it is not immediately obvious that these structures 
are all that generates value. I believe that it seems to us that there are other such 
sources of value; and I believe that it seems to us that there are helpful ways about 
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deliberating about particular values and particular identities. If so, Frankfurt’s fairly 
unhelpful conclusion does not yield a satisfactory account of practical identity.
     So Frankfurt’s broad account of identity can be read to be attempting to satisfy all 
my three kinds of identity-accounts. He is successful in providing an account of 
agential identity, for he explains how it is that our selves bring about actions. 
However, he is less successful when it comes to his account answering to the 
demands of personal identity and practical identity. The manner in which his account 
fails in these two other cases differ from each other. With respect to personal identity, 
the account offered is merely incomplete. The account of personal identity as a will 
still requires further boundaries to delineate what we think of as a person. Yet, it is 
then unclear what value the will then adds to drawing these boundaries, when a 
different way of doing so might alone suffice. As for practical identity, the account 
offered is complete but is inadequate for answering a demand we require of practical 
identity - the demand that our account richly guides us in decision-making.
     I must point out that the criticisms of Frankfurt’s account here emerge only from 
my specific manner of splitting up accounts of the self, and it is by making such 
distinctions that Frankfurt’s account is seen to fall short. Frankfurt’s account is an 
admirable single and coherent account of identity. It is only when subject to 
questioning by a variety of demands in this manner that it can then be seen to have 
shortcomings. Only by making distinct the questions of agential, personal and 
practical identities that these shortcomings emerge. Part of what I hope to accomplish 
through this exercise then, is to suggest that it may not be desirable to attempt to offer 
a single, complete and unitary account of identity that handles all questions of 
identity. It is my view that such an account is not necessary, and if even a philosopher 
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of Frankfurt’s calibre cannot give us a satisfactory one, we should have misgivings in 
trying to construct a different one.
     Still, the continued success of Frankfurt’s account as an account of agential 
identity, even in light of the failure of the account in being a comprehensible one 
about all issues of identity, should make us comfortable in building an account of each 
kind of identity account without necessarily referring to or attempting to encompass 
another kind of account of identity. This is then true for practical identity. There is no 
necessary reason why who I am in terms of personal identity or agential identity 
should strongly determine what I must value as a practical identity as I need not value 
myself in those guises. If so, we can talk sensibly about practical identity without 
necessarily talking about either our continued existence or the processes that allow us 
to act or value things. Here, I therefore leave behind my accounts of agential identity 




ACCOUNTS OF PRACTICAL IDENTITY 
(TWO MODELS OF HAVING ALREADY DONE SO)
     This chapter aims to show that there is no particular kind of practical identity  that 
we must necessarily have. A more specific aim is to show that Christine Korsgaard’s 
account of moral identity as practical identity is not, as she claims, a necessary or 
governing one. I shall first describe moral identity and show what it is conceptually 
neither necessary nor governing. However, though I show why moral identity is not 
conceptually necessary, we might still think that it is practically  necessary if there are 
no feasible live alternatives. To suggest otherwise, I shall sketch out an alternative 
account that I do see as such a live option - Henry Rosemont’s role ethics. I then 
compare the two accounts and show that Korsgaard’s worldview lacks resources to 
see sources of value beyond autonomy, for it  commits her to understanding reasons as 
lawlike: universal, general and non-contradictory. Yet, seeing otherwise enriches us 
with regards to our practical identities.
The Non-Necessity of Practical Identity
     I must  begin by explaining what I mean when I claim that there is no particular 
account of practical identity that we must necessarily  give about ourselves. To re-
iterate, practical identity is the set of characteristics under which we recognise selves 
and value selves when we attempt to carry out meaningful actions. There are 
numerous practical identities under which I can recognise myself. I can see myself as 
a student, a teacher, a father, a son, a leader, a follower, a lover, a friend, a particular 
individual called Shaun, a cosmopolitan, a virtue ethicist, a utilitarian or a human 
being. Yet, while I can be recognised and valued under any of these guises, I can also 
correctly  not be recognised as any of these at a point in time. It is in this sense that I 
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argue that practical identity  is not necessary. There is no particular practical identity 
that we always necessarily need to identify ourselves with.
     However, in Sources of Normativity, Korsgaard argues otherwise. Although she 
agrees that most, in fact nearly  all, practical identities are contingent and non-
necessary, there is one practical identity that is necessary. This is the practical identity 
of moral identity  - the identity  of being an end. Not only is this practical identity 
necessary, it is also a practical identity that is of governing importance. Such a 
necessary  and governing identity  thus restrains all the other possible practical identity, 
and makes the normative values of all other practical identities conditional on 
coherence with moral identity. It is therefore worth considering and critiquing 
Korsgaard’s account of moral identity. Partly  because it  is a good account of practical 
identity, but also because its claim of governing necessity closes off valuable space 
for alternative accounts of practical identity, in particular my proposed account of 
narrative identity. I shall therefore look at it carefully and reject it.
Korsgaard’s Neo-Kantian Ethics of Moral Identity
     Korsgaard also makes the distinction of a practical identity distinct from other 
conceptions of identity. She writes that “the conception of one’s identity [she is 
interested in dealing with] is not a theoretical one, a view about what as a matter of 
inescapable scientific fact you are. It is better understood as a description under which 
you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking.... [And 
it] is the conceptions of ourselves that are most important to us that give rise to 
unconditional obligations. For to violate them is to lose your integrity and so your 
identity, and to no longer be who you are” (101-2). So Korsgaard makes the 
distinction between the self that values and is valued and whose self-description 
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generates value for himself, and the self that is identified and re-identifiable in some 
way, whether as a continuing physical or psychological subject. She is only  concerned 
with the former.
     However, this account of practical identity is not exactly the same as my own 
distinction of practical identity that I have previous given. (I discuss this difference, 
and also the relationship between identity  and autonomy, further in Appendix A.) 
Korsgaard’s distinction is strictly first-personal in that it is an identity  that  is 
possessed by a person about himself. It is a description under which a person 
reflexively identifies himself, and because of this first-personal identification, he is 
then obligated to act in line with that identity  or lose a sense of himself. It is an 
identity  that is had only by the person about himself. In my account, however, I make 
no such demand because I do think that there is some rich way in which others can 
determine our values for us as well by recognising us under various descriptions of 
practical identity; conceptions that rightfully give us obligations even if we refuse to 
recognise ourselves under those descriptions. 
     Korsgaard’s fuller account of practical identity begins by taking that identity  to be 
an endorsing reflective consciousness, which she also calls a free will. She notes that 
human agents are self-conscious and have reflective minds; and the “reflective mind 
cannot settle for perception and desire, not just as such. It  needs a reason. Otherwise, 
at least as long as it reflects, it cannot commit itself to go forward....We need reasons 
because our impulses must be able to withstand reflective scrutiny. We have reasons if 
they  do. The normative word ‘reason’ refers to a kind of reflective success” (93, 
author’s emphasis). The kind of reflective success that Korsgaard then asserts reason 
to take is a reflection in terms of principles and laws. So she goes on and writes that 
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“since the will is practical reason, it cannot be conceived as acting and choosing for 
no reason. Since reasons are derived from principles, the free will must have a 
principle” (98). 
     This is what Korsgaard calls the law of a free will, which is simply that the will 
must have a law. This is a law that  Korsgaard points out to be simply  arising from the 
nature of the free will. From this nature, wills have the ability to follow other 
principles and make new laws for itself. It is by  this procedure, that we then go on to 
create values, and so Korsgaard writes that “values are constructed by a procedure, 
the procedure of making law for ourselves” (112). Yet how do we choose which laws 
to make? Korsgaard states that we make laws in relation to various practical identities 
that we do adopt. We ask ourselves which would be laws that a person of such-and-
such an identity  has reason to adopt, and adopt those laws in relation to our 
possessing such-and-such an identity. Therefore, the law-making nature of the free 
will leads us to adopt practical identities that can then be in turn regulated by the laws 
that it makes. 
     Korsgaard points out that most of our practical identities are contingent and can be 
shed. However, she claims that not all practical identities are contingent and that  there 
is one necessary practical identity  - moral identity. She claims that “[what] is not 
contingent is that you must be governed by some conception of your practical 
identity.... It is a reason that springs from your humanity  itself, from your identity 
simply  as a human being, a reflective animal who needs reasons to act and to live. 
And so it is a reason you have only if you treat your humanity as a practical, 
normative, form of identity, that is, if you value yourself as a human being.... If this is 
right, our identity as moral beings - as people who value themselves as human beings 
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- stands behind our more particular practical identities.... Not every form of practical 
identity  is contingent or relative after all: moral identity is necessary” (120-2, author’s 
emphasis).
     Korsgaard also points out that the nature of principles and reasons is public in that 
these reasons are inherently shareable and shared. This is made evident from the sheer 
observation that we do share reasons and that if “these reasons really were essentially 
private, it would be impossible to exchange or to share them” (135). What is shared is 
both the meaning of the reason, an ability  to understand why it  is a reason, as well as 
the normative force of a reason, an appreciation of the command to action given by a 
reason. It is being able to see the principle that generates the reason and be motivated 
by that principle. A reason is a reason for every  will. This does not mean that we have 
to unthinkingly  accept or obey all reasons, but that we can and are motivated to reflect 
on them. What it also means is that a reason cannot be a reason just for one will and 
not for another, and it  would be a failure of understanding what a reason is to say  that 
this could be the case.
     It is because of this nature of reasons that we are obliged to respect other wills than 
our own. For, under the pains of inconsistency, given that we consider our will’s 
moral identity, as a practical identity, to be a reason for respecting our own will, we 
have to equally  respect other wills with moral identity. And given that moral identity 
is a necessary identity that every human being has by virtue of being human and that 
no human being can give up, we necessarily are obliged to respect other wills than our 
own. So in order to recognise our own necessary practical identity as a self-legislator, 
we have to recognise other self-legislators as well. We also have to recognise the 
nature of legislation - where the reasons that emerge from the principles we follow 
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must apply as reasons for us as well as others. In other words, the reasons we use are 
universal reasons - what counts as a reason for me counts as a reason for all reasoning 
beings.
     For Korsgaard, this moral identity is privileged, noting that “in one sense, moral 
identity  is just  like any other form of practical identity. To act morally  is to act a 
certain way simply because you are human, to act as one who values her humanity 
should.... But moral identity also stands in a special relationship to our other 
identities. First, moral identity is what makes it necessary to have other forms of 
practical identity, and they derive part of their importance, and so part of their 
normativity from it. They are important in part because we need them. If we do not 
treat our humanity as normative identity, none of our other identities can be 
normative, and then we can have no reasons to act at all. Moral identity  is therefore 
inescapable. Second, and for that reason, moral identity exerts a kind of governing 
role over the other kinds. Practical conceptions of your identity  which are 
fundamentally inconsistent with the value of humanity must be given up” (130).
     So Korsgaard’s account emerges from a conception of the self as a will that is a 
self-conceiver and self-legislator. It conceives of the self as a being that necessarily 
governs his self through laws, and is in turn governed by the nature of laws. For 
Korsgaard, without such self-governance, the self cannot make sense of his own 
values and would cease to be a self. This makes the law-giving nature of the self a 
necessary  feature, and the valuing of this feature in our selves a necessary  valuing. 
The self as will is therefore a necessary  practical identity. Moreover, since this 
identity  is required for other practical identities, not only is it  necessary, but it is also 
privileged - it is more valuable than other identities generated from more contingent 
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sources of normativity. For it is only if we treat it  as valuable that we can treat any 
other practical identity  as valuable. So we must both treat  it as being more valuable 
and give it governing importance in terms of the identities we have.
The Conceptual Non-Necessity of Moral Identity
     I must first point out that  there is no reason why something being necessary and 
foundational should make it to be of governing importance. It is unclear why, if 
something is required for something else, we should then give it any kind of priority 
in value. Just because, for example, I am a caregiver for Jane, and Jane’s wellbeing 
depends upon me, it does not then mean that I have reason to take better care of 
myself or make the care of myself a priority. Thus, even if it were true that moral 
identity  is necessary for all other practical identities, in that I can only have other 
practical identities only if I have moral identity, it  does not follow that I need to then 
privilege it as a practical identity. There is no reason to suppose, as Korsgaard does, 
that practical identities that are fundamentally  inconsistent with it must be given up. If 
taking care of Jane were to be an inevitable drain on my resources, leading to my 
death, it does not follow that I should not do that anyway.
     In fact, we need not even think that moral identity  is a necessary practical identity. 
My distinction between agential identity and practical identity quite simply shows 
this. For the self as a legislating will may be necessary  as an agential identity, but not 
necessary  as a practical identity. The self as will may be the mechanism that enables 
us to value in such a manner and we may need to identity  ourselves with it as such a 
mechanism in order to value other things in other practical identities. However, it 
does not then follow that  we need to identify  ourselves with it as a valuable identity 
and defer to it at all, let alone a governing way. A basketball player might value 
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winning basketball games and not value his basketballing abilities, even though his 
abilities may be what wins him games. Likewise, just because I can value things and 
adopt roles does not mean that I need to value my  ability to value, even if it is this 
ability which then allows me to adopt other roles.
     This is not to say  that we cannot do so. For Korsgaard is right to note that, in some 
sense, moral identity  is just like any  other practical identity. This is the sense where 
we recognise that it  is a plausible practical identity  to adopt, and we can choose to 
value ourselves in precisely those terms. We can have that identity and have it guide 
us. However, there is no reason to think that this identity is necessary. It may be true 
that being a valuer is a necessary  agential identity if we are to value anything at all, 
but it is not a necessary practical identity  in that being such an agent should necessary 
require us to value it or have it  guide our actions in any  way. There is nothing that we 
necessarily must value until we adopt a practical identity. For only then does such a 
practical identity  place demands on us and require us to act in line with it. However, 
there is no necessary practical identity  that we need to adopt, not even the practical 
identity of being a valuer.
     Yet, even if we accept that it  is not  conceptually necessary to see moral identity  as 
a practical identity, we might still think that it is in practice necessary to see moral 
identity  as a practical identity. It  may be that a person who does not take moral 
identity  as a practical identity  ceases to be recognisable as a person. Perhaps we 
cannot conceive of such a person. He would be a beast. This is because we, as 
practical persons, actually do value ourselves as reasoning, social animals and so 
extend that same demand unto others. After all, as already noted, accounting for 
identity  is not merely  a first personal activity  but also second and third personal. If so, 
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it would inescapable not because of the concept of practical identity itself but because 
of the way  we apply it and we might think that we cannot apply it in a manner that is 
not as a lawfully  rational and social animal. What we then need is a feasible 
alternative way of conceiving our practical identity. That is what I turn to now.
Rosemont’s Neo-Confucian Ethics of Role-Identity
     Henry Rosemont, in a well-known series of works, has developed such an 
alternative with a role-centric self. (In this thesis, I refer solely to his unpublished 
paper, “Confucian Role Ethics”, as it is the most  developed and concise statement of 
his view contra will-centric accounts of the self.) Rosemont also takes the human 
being as a practical identity and agrees that the humans are social and reasonable. But 
his account of reason differs from Korsgaard’s law-centric one. For him, humanity’s 
valuable feature is not  a reflective capacity but a capacity to possess (social) roles. 
While he does not dispute that there are roles that we can choose, he locates value not 
in choice but  simply in the bearing of roles. Humans are “basically constituted by the 
roles we live in the midst of others.” (7, author’s emphasis) Being in roles give us 
reasons to act. We need not conceive of ourselves as reflective animals to conceive of 
ourselves as animals with roles. Living in roles, we already gain practical identities.
     Rosemont denies that it is conceptually or practically necessary to refer to an 
autonomous self over and above the (social) roles that we live. In fact, in his scheme 
of practical roles, it is not possible to do so. He adamantly asserts that when we 
remove the sum total of our roles, there is then nothing left of the self (6). For a role is 
a relationship that is held between particular persons and not with abstractions from 
those persons. So roles are bound in relationships like teacher-student, father-son, 
brother-brother, wife-husband, boss-subordinate. A human being is then the meta-
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description of a being that bears all these roles. “Human” is not in itself a role because 
there is no social relationship with another being. Neither do any of us have a 
relationship with the rest of humanity  as a concept, because we do not have 
relationships with such concepts. For it is only our relational roles that give us a 
practical identity, and there is nothing left over.
     He argues against  an essential practical self by  emphasising our interactions. We 
are always social beings in social roles, albeit contingent ones, as we are born into and 
live in communities. As our roles change, our practical selves change too. So he 
writes, “marriage made me a different person, as did becoming a father, and later, 
grandfather. Divorce or becoming a widower would change me yet again. While my 
role as student never disappears, it was overshadowed after my formal studies were 
complete as I became a professor. Former students become young friends, young 
friends become old friends, all of which have an effect on who I am and am defined.... 
Moreover, a moment’s reflection on our interpersonal behavior from this perspective 
should suggest that seeking an essential self, something that remains constant and 
unchanging through the vicissitudes of our lives, might be like chasing a will-o’-the-
wisp” (6-7, author’s emphasis). 
     Neither are our social roles themselves generalisable in terms of mere humanity. 
We respond to another not in terms of some generic humanity  behind each person but 
in terms of the particular kind of relationship we have with them. We do not respond 
to any kind of essential self in others.  Rosemont asks rhetorically, “does not our tone 
of voice change when speaking to our parents and then to a friend? Is our demeanor 
the same with a lover as with a younger sibling? Is the visage we present to neighbors 
the same we present to strangers? For virtually all of us, I believe, the answer to these 
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and similar questions is “No,” and if so, then in an important sense, we might come to 
understand that who we “really  are” is a function of who we are with, when, and 
under what circumstances” (7). It is not some common valuable feature that all 
humans have in general that has us responding, but rather the particular exchanges 
with interlocutors that generate value.
     In fact, the extreme depth of particularity of this account can be seen in the way we 
behave differently when we are with different friends and the way we treat each friend 
differently. For the demands of each friend in each different circumstance might call 
for different responses and actions. It might be better to lend money  to John rather 
than Jim when they are in the exact same predicament if John, for various plausible 
reasons, will put the money to good use while Jim will not. It  might be better to speak 
more sharply to Jim than to John if Jim is not as sensitive as John. The deep 
particularity  of each relationship means that our actions differ from friend to friend. 
So even if we stand in the exact same “friend” relation to another person, what the 
role of ‘friend’ may  demand would still differ from person to person. We are therefore 
not responding to some common relationship type, but rather to the demands of a 
particular person in each role.
     Furthermore, these roles are not constant. A friendship may end, a new friendship 
may be born. Enemies can turn into friends, friends can turn into lovers. Our wards 
can become our guardians, our guardians into our wards. With each change of role, 
our values and our actions change, and so our practical identities change with them. 
Moreover, as these roles can change, so can the quality  of the relationship informing 
the roles. For situations change to give a role a different demand, and personalities 
change to affect the manner in which we interact with one another in our roles. If so, 
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then in reaction to these changes of situation and personality, our practical identities 
and values change even within the roles in which we already  live. There is therefore 
no unshifting locus of values that we can appeal to at any time if we focus on our 
relationships and roles as the sources of our practical identity since our roles shift and 
our values shift with them.
     In Rosemont’s account there is thus no essential self that stands behind or 
alongside all of our roles, governing our roles and practical identities. There is no 
single constant law or law-giver that fundamentally organises and operates in all of 
these relations. If there is any  commonality that emerges through all of our roles, this 
commonality is accidental and so is not essential to explaining the values of our roles. 
Our roles and relationships are the sources of normativity, generating values and 
reasons, simply because we find ourselves in them and identify ourselves with them. 
They  are not sources of normativity because we, in some sense of a governing 
essential self, choose them, choose to continue being in them or even choose to value 
them. Instead, they are sources of normativity simply because we find ourselves in 
them, and when we find ourselves in them, we already find them to be sources of 
values.
Accounting for Practical Identity - Comparing the Two Accounts
     I hope you do not think that a being which configures his practical identity in 
Rosemont’s way is a beast. That is to say  that although such a being does not appeal 
to rational, universal laws governing his practical identity, he is not inconceivable as a 
human being. I will not analyse the rightness of Rosemont’s account anymore than I 
do the rightness of Korsgaard’s. For I am not interested in analysing the approaches to 
see which account gives us “better” results. Both emerge from long and distinguished 
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traditions and are put forth as viable accounts of practical self-conception today. I thus 
take it that both these rival accounts are feasible ones that are not only  conceptually 
coherent, but also plausible in that they are accounts we can actually tell about 
ourselves. What I am interested in asserting is that the existence of both accounts 
shows the non-necessity  of either one of the accounts, and that  there really are 
alternative ways of conceiving practical selfhood.
     It  is interesting to note the incommensurability of the two accounts on offer. The 
two accounts cannot be integrated into a single account because the stances they take 
are so radically  different from each other that their different configurations refuse 
amalgamation. For the Korsgaard approach relies upon there being an abstract, 
essential law-giver outside of particular relations to generate value; for that is the 
source of its normativity. It  is this essential self that confers value upon things. Yet, 
Rosemont’s account wholly  denies the existence of this entity  as a source of value, for 
admitting it would misplace, in his worldview, the value of a relationship. It would 
lead to us finding the value in the choosing of the relationship rather than the mere 
living of it. For in his view, our values comes out  of our relationships without the 
further legitimation of these values by  endorsements given by some further essential 
self.
     Both orientations also have different accounts of reason. Korsgaard’s account 
emphasises universal lawlikeness as a defining feature of her reasons. Reasons are 
reasons precisely because they have this universally governing quality  about them. 
Not only are they communicable and understandable to all subjects of reason, but they 
also have a normative force felt by all subjects of reasons. Reasons are irreducibly 
universal and a reason for one is a reason for all. Korsgaard values such regularity. 
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Rosemont’s account sees reasons to be particularistic and non-lawlike. They emerge 
from particular relationships and do not extend beyond them. While they are 
communicable and understandable to all reasonable creatures, their normative force 
does not extend beyond the particular situation a reason arises in. Rosemont, in fact, 
prizes this non-lawlike irregularity, finding value in its responsiveness to situations 
and persons in different roles.
     Note that the incommensurability lies not in their descriptions of what the world is 
but in their accounts of what we can value in the world. Practical identities are 
accounts of identities about how we are structured as valuers in the world. Having a 
practical identity then structures the kinds of values we do find in the world and gives 
explanations of the world in terms of values by emphasising different  valuable 
features it finds in the world. So both accounts of practical identity are describing the 
same world, but  they account for the values present in the world in different ways. 
Yet, there remains a noteworthy difference in their stances. Rosemont can still admit 
that it is possible to structure the world in Korsgaard’s way  and admit of an essential 
self, but deny that it is more valuable to do so. Korsgaard, on the other hand, given 
her claims about the necessity  of moral identity, must  claim that Rosemont’s way of 
structuring the world is incoherent. 
     In fact, there is good reason to think that Rosemont’s account is lacking in some 
regard. For the present existence of the notion of an abstract self in our conceptual 
language of practical identity cannot simply be ignored, and so creates problems for 
the Rosemont practical self. Alan Montefiore, making a point about Confucian 
thought in general but whose point does apply  to Rosemont’s specific account, 
suggests that an abstract human practical identity, standing apart from particular 
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social roles, proves to be particularly efficacious in interrogating the demands of those 
roles. The attractiveness of a law-driven universal concept of humanity with dignity 
as a standard of ethics seem to make it a fair demand that roles answer to this concept. 
Montefiore suggests that with the acknowledgement of such a demand, a Pandora’s 
box is opened that Rosemont-type accounts must  respond to (“Personal Identity  and 
Family Commitment”, 143-62).
     Yet, despite such possibly  unattractive features, it is perhaps too quick to 
pronounce the model as being superfluous once we have a Korsgaard-type account as 
a Korsgaard-type account is also lacking. Rosemont’s account captures possible 
sources of value that are simply not present, and which cannot be present, in 
Korsgaard’s account. Firstly  and notably, there is the value of inconstancy and 
responsiveness to difference that so strongly informs Rosemont’s account. A law-
centric model of values and reasons is, by  definition, antagonistic to such difference 
and might, at worst, work to eradicate it. Yet, even it if does not choose to do so, it 
would at least  fail to recognise it. Therefore, Korsgaard’s account does not admit of 
certain values and also fails to orientate itself in the direction of any of these 
alternative values. Given that this is just what Rosemont’s account does, we should 
not dismiss it out of hand.
     Secondly, it  may not just be that there are non-lawlike values to be responded to in 
existing situations, but also that there is also a value of creativity, originality and play 
that is suppressed or not admitted in a lawlike structure of thought. A Rosemont-type 
account is more able to accommodate such open-ended creativity and it is therefore 
useful as a foil and a counter-account to Korsgaard’s account; though of course it  is 
also a good account on its own merits. In other words, a Rosemont-type account 
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allows for more creativity. To be sure, a lot of creativity sometimes needs an existing 
structure as a foil to set itself up against. Mere randomness would not be especially 
original. Yet, the drive to be creative admits of a drive that is not recognised or 
governed by  laws. It lies beyond it. It may be attractive, and even creative, to try  to 
put things into fixed structures and laws. It is nice, for example, if in writing this 
thesis, I made every single paragraph twelve lines long. But it is not necessary  and, 
perhaps, it is sometimes more meaningful if I added an thirteenth line.
     From a Korsgaardian perspective, however, it is hard to recognise these values. For 
given the centrality the account places on laws, and given that the account’s position 
of abstraction is already removed from the concerns of a more particularly situated 
practical identity, the account  admit of no other. Only when confronted with 
Rosemont’s account do the limitations of a Korsgaardian perspective becomes clear. 
However, from the Korsgaardian perspective, the Rosemontian account is not 
available since the latter account is one that refuses to perform the act of abstraction. 
So from that  perspective, there does not seem to be a feasible alternative. For the 
alternative is to look for a form of anti-lawlikeness that contradicts the very  law-
making structures that  enabled the abstraction in the first place. The Rosemontian 
account shows that the abstract perspective is not necessary, and if so, we can shift 
accounts of practical identity.
     The comparison between the two accounts of practical identity show us two main 
things. Firstly, talking intelligibly about the two accounts simultaneously  shows that 
we can hold two particular accounts of practical identity to be good ones at the same 
time. Even though both accounts are conflicting, it is not necessary to reject  one and 
endorse the other entirely. There is a way  in which we can hold both opposed ideas in 
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our minds at the same time, and still retain the ability  to function. Indeed, achieving 
this way of doing so, at least according to F. Scott Fitzgerald, is the test of a first-rate 
intelligence. It is only by being able to operate in both modes of practical identity  at 
the same time that we are able to fully appreciate both the value of lawlike reasons 
and also the value of the more particularistic reasons of personal relationships. For the 
value of personal relationships cannot, as shown by Rosemont, be reduced to a set of 
laws.
     Secondly, it  shows that practical identity  is in a practical sense not necessary but 
contingent. It shows that the very concept of practical identity, as I use it, does not 
restrict us to then necessarily having a particular practical identity. It  is not true that 
we must necessarily  adopt one kind of practical identity or risk acting in a self-
contradictory manner. More specifically, it shows that it  is certainly  false that we 
necessarily must have what Korsgaard calls moral identity, or law-like identity, 
govern our other relations. That is not to say that such an identity is never valuable or 
to say that such identity, or even at times theorising with such an identity, is 
undesirable. What it does say is that such a practical identity is neither inescapable 
nor necessarily of governing importance. If this is so, then we are more free to choose 
and adopt different practical identities for we need not defer to the overarching 
demands of moral identity.
     However, while I have shown that there is no conceptual nor practical reason why 
we need to defer to such moral identity, it does not mean that we should quite simply 
do away with moral identity altogether. For I believe that there are practical reasons 
why we want to continue to maintain such identity in some form, though not  wholly 
defer to it. Simply, we need to begin an account of practical identity  from somewhere, 
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and since moral identity  is the product of a dominant way of theorising about practical 
identity, we begin there. It is only by  relating ourselves to existing practical identities 
that they can generate the normative force they do over us. Without this historical 
weight, such identities feel arbitrary  and insignificant.  In the next chapter, I develop 
my account in a manner that maintains the psychological weight of our practical 
identities while allowing it to be modified in ways that are needed to meet the 
demands of practical identity today.
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THREE
HISTORY OF A PRACTICAL IDENTITY
(A STORY OF HOW ONE ACCOUNT BECAME SO)
     While practical identities are not constrained in the sense of us necessarily having 
one particular practical identity, they  are nevertheless constrained by contingent social 
realities. This is because such realities give the resources for the formation of practical 
identities. Our practical identities are therefore limited by dominant conceptual 
perspectives from our past, practical conditions of the present and demands of the 
future. In this chapter, I shall show this with two genealogies of Western thought - one 
by Christine Korsgaard and one by  Charles Taylor. Other than the general 
demonstration of the above point, the genealogies serve three other purposes. First, 
they  stress the contingency of Korsgaard’s account and again undermine the claim of 
moral identity’s necessity. Second, they show why, despite not actually being 
necessary, the lack of alternative robust models may still make dominant models feel 
necessary. Third, it sets up the conditions that make narrative identity attractive.
     I begin by first presenting Korsgaard’s neat genealogy  of the self in Western 
thought in Sources of Normativity, where she arranges the development of ethics in 
the West as single and coherent  response developed over time to the normative 
question: why must I be moral? I then contrast  Korsgaard’s account with one given by 
Taylor in Sources of the Self. I do so to show that the concept of the autonomous will 
is fixed in a specific historical and cultural milieu. This suggests that what is 
demanded of an account of practical identity  is contingent upon the prevailing 
practices of a time and place, and so is not universal and timeless. If so, practical 
identity  accounting is situated in a given time and place, and need not aim to yield an 
ahistorical account. However, this would mean that such accounting still requires a 
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history to give it with meaning. I thus conclude the chapter by extending the 
genealogy of the will to enable a meaningful narrative mode of practical accounting.
Korsgaard’s Genealogy of the Western Ethical Self
     Korsgaard begins by  noting that it is a fact  of human life that humans value things. 
To value something is to be guided by it - to bring about or obtain what is valuable. 
Korsgaard, like we will later see Taylor to also do in his own genealogy, begins with 
Plato. She notes that Plato claimed that what make things valuable is that there is a 
reality  to what things ultimately are. He claimed that  there are actual values existing 
that guide us towards them. These actual values motivate us to bring the most 
valuable possible state of affairs into existence. It is from this claim that an idea of 
personal excellence is generated. For it  takes the self as a thing, and it aims to be a 
valuable and excellent self. So to be guided to bring out the best form of yourself is to 
be guided by an idea of the best form of yourself. To endeavour to realise perfection is 
to be good at being what you are as a human being. We are therefore motivated to be 
good human beings (3). 
     Korsgaard then points out that this line of reasoning leads us to a puzzling outcome 
- if we were guided towards perfection, how is it the case that we still end up with so 
much imperfection? If we all want to be good human beings, how is it  that there are 
so many bad human beings around us? Confronting this puzzle hence generated 
answers involving claims of misperceptions and ignorance - we do bad things because 
we either misperceive what is good or we are ignorant of what is good. It is in light  of 
this that  Korsgaard then notes Aristotle to have proposed a rather simple and obvious 
solution - training. For a well-brought up person will value rightly and act rightly, so 
those who fall short must  then be persons who are not well-brought up. What needs to 
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be done is then to bring someone up right. The method to rightly bring someone up, 
as well as control those who are not  already well-brought up, is to impose laws upon 
persons (4).
     Hence, an ethics was generated in line with laws, which imposes obligations upon 
those under the law. Korsgaard notes that obligations differ importantly from 
excellence in that with excellences, the value exerted is attractive while with 
obligations, the value exerted is compulsive. We wish to become excellent, but we are 
forced to obey an obligation. So she notes that “obligation is the imposition of value 
on a reluctant, recalcitrant, resistant matter” (4). It is this idea that was picked up in 
the Christian era, where the centrality  of laws in Western ethical thought developed in 
line with the obligations that were seen to be imposing value on the world. For 
Christianity  introduces accounts of fallen humanity and the depravity  of the world, 
where value must be forced and imposed upon a reluctant humanity (4). Particular 
moral failure is turned into general humanity-wide moral failure, and laws were 
entrenched as the ethical metaphysics of the world.
     Despite increasing secularism, ethical thought did not turn away from the form of 
obligations, but instead, what changed was the manner in which we see ourselves as 
fallen. For the world and us still remained resistant to reason and value. If so, then 
value still had to be imposed upon the world and thus obligations remain the 
predominant form of ethical negotiation (4-5). In other words, we are, by  nature, 
bearers of terrible passions that  lead us astray and so need reason and laws to 
constrain us. And since this remains the mode in which we continue to conceive of the 
world, then obligations still matter. Thus Korsgaard writes that “the ethics of 
autonomy is the only one consistent with the metaphysics of the modern world and 
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the ethics of autonomy is an ethics of obligation” (5). It is precisely  because the West 
continues to think of the world in such a manner even today that an ethics of 
autonomy retains its preeminence.
     Korsgaard thus conceives of a history of ethical thought as an attempt to justify 
why it  is that  we want to be moral and act in line with obligations. The normative 
question is “must I really do this? Why must I do it?” (26). The conception of the 
human agent is therefore one that  is, in some sense, trying to reject reasons to act in a 
moral way. I say  ‘in some sense’ because it is easy  to reject reasons if the human 
agent simply  refuses to listen to reasons. However, the human agent is conceived of as 
a contradictory  figure who wishes to sincerely  listen to reasons, but still find a way to 
not follow them. He is both desiring to follow the good and also to resist the good. So 
it is not enough to answer “because it is good” and show him that it is good. For even 
if the agent recognises all of this, the agent would still not find it sufficient reason to 
act on it, because he still needs something, a reason, to reject his motivations to resist 
the good.
     The nature of the question grants certain features to the accounts of normativity in 
the Western tradition. Since it  is an account meant as a reply to a person asking why it 
is that he should be moral, the answer, Korsgaard notes, must have several 
characteristic features. First, it must be radically  reflexive in that it must be a 
satisfactory answer to someone who ask “why should I be moral?” Second, it  must be 
transparent in that the nature of explanation cannot conceal the true nature of its 
motivations from the person the account is being offered to. In other words it cannot 
be because “a monster will eat you otherwise” unless if it were really  true that a 
monster would eat you otherwise.  Finally  it must appeal to the interlocutor’s sense of 
57
identity  (17). It must explain why I must be good. What is offered in the Western 
ethical tradition are subsequently a number of answers seeking to satisfy all these 
criteria and convince an agent to be moral.
     Korsgaard then runs through a list of succeeding answers to that question. The first 
option she proposes is that  of voluntarism, which derives the command of morality 
from someone who has a legitimate authority over the moral agent and so can make 
laws for him, such as God or a political sovereign (18-9). This is the view she sees to 
be best exemplified by Hobbes and Pufendorf, who argued for the legitimacy of a 
sovereign binding us to our moral obligations. However, she then notes that 
succeeding thinkers showed a fatal flaw in that argument in that it does not explain 
why we would be obligated to listen to the sovereign. Presumably, we need further 
reasons to explain why these authorities are legitimate, and if so, then the ultimate 
source of justification cannot lie in sovereigns themselves but something beyond. 
There must be something legitimising the legitimate authorities, and so voluntarism 
gives way to something else - realism.
      The second option is then that of realism; one should be moral because of the 
authority of real moral obligations or reasons in the world and moral agents can 
discover these and follow them (19). Thus, philosophers proposed accounts declaring 
there to be real moral substance in the world grounding normativity. Such are the 
accounts given by Richard, Price, Clarke and Thomas Nagel, among others. Yet, 
Korsgaard notes, these accounts are unsatisfying in that  it ends the debate by 
gesturing to mysterious entities. As she puts it, “some things appear normative, and 
there is no reason to doubt that they  are what they  seem” (44). So she writes that “that 
is the problem with realism: it refuses to answer the normative question. It  is a way of 
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saying that it cannot be done. Or rather, more commonly, it is a way of saying that it 
need not be done” (39). Moral realism is unsatisfying to the human agent as it  is a 
“just-because” answer.
     The third option is then that of reflective endorsement, which aims to show that we 
should follow moral standards because doing so conforms to our practical interests 
(19). This account, she claims, was given by theorists like Hume, Mill and Bernard 
Williams. We should be moral because when we reflect upon it, we realise that the 
outcomes of being moral are outcomes we would endorse. Korsgaard’s disagreements 
with each particular view of reflective endorsement will not  be considered here. But 
eventually, she takes her own final account to also be a more complete form of 
reflective endorsement by taking the process further. She does not see reflective 
endorsement to merely justify why we should be moral, but argues that reflective 
endorsement is the process of being moral itself (89). Choosing principles and reasons 
on the basis that they can withstand a certain kind of reflection, reflection on whether 
or not they can be good universal reasons, is morality.
     The failure of the first two options and the incompleteness of the third leads 
Korsgaard to defend her autonomous account as the best account of normativity. I will 
not repeat that account in detail here, since I had already discussed it at  length in 
Chapter 2. But generally, the answer to the normative question is that we should be 
moral because of who we are as rational valuing animals. If we are not moral, we will 
no longer be ourselves as we will not be able to consistently find any other thing 
valuable since all our other practical identities are bound up with our moral identity. It 
is only  by  being moral that we have rightful authority over ourselves. The person who 
asks the normative question already assumes moral identity, for it is moral identity 
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itself that allows us to ask the question sensibly  and demand a sensible answer. For 
the questioner is asking for a law, and it  only makes sense to ask for a law if you are a 
subject of laws.
     Korsgaard’s account is as much an exercise in arguing for her own view of 
practical identity as it  is a historical account  of the self. For she does not only  show a 
temporal development, from Plato through to Purfendorf, Price, Hume then Kant; but 
also gives an account of progress, where each succeeding account is supposed to have 
improved upon previous accounts. Yet, the manner in which she frames matters also 
shows her own account to have been strongly influenced by  these other accounts. She 
notes that it is only in reaction to how a previous account fails that the successive 
account develops and it is in reaction to all of the previous accounts that  she then 
develops her own account and offers it up as the best possible option. Consequently, 
her eventual solution is both framed by the problem that sets it up - how one should 
answer the normative question, as well as how she takes other accounts to have 
handled that question.
      However, what her story hides is the extent to which it is a story  - how much it is 
constructed. What is made less obvious through her presentation is how her examples 
are chosen precisely because they best explain her point. Moreover, the central 
framing of the enterprise in terms of answering the normative question in turn only 
draws upon certain features of those examples and  so gives the entire story a certain 
flavour. For her framing of the question already gives her answer a privileged bias. Of 
course the autonomous self would more likely  be the source of normativity if the 
questioner is already conceived of as an autonomous self. “Another self” or “some 
non-self-like entity”, the respective answers of voluntarism and realism, are less 
60
satisfying answers. Now, this does not make it a bad story. In fact, it is a very good 
story. However, it is not the only story  that can be told, and to see how we can retell 
the story, I turn to Taylor’s account of the same events.
Taylor’s Genealogy of the Western Ethical Self
      In this section, I give a stripped-down genealogy of an aspect of the self as 
presented in Taylor’s Sources of the Self. I only look at the self as a free, autonomous 
will, a la Korsgaard. In that massive book, Taylor gives a more thorough presentation 
of the various sources of value in Western civilisation, of which the development of 
the idea of a free, self-determining subject that takes freedom to be a good is only one 
part. Here, I do not go into the fine details of his analysis. Neither will I trace the 
development of this central idea alongside other ideas that Taylor points out to 
conflict with it. Nor will I examine the many  conclusions that  arise from the 
contestation of these different ideas. Instead, all that I am presenting here is a rather 
linear history of the free will, crudely untangled from other strands of the self, that 
does not take into account the messy shifts in the development of that idea and also 
the other ideas that make up the modern ethical self.
     My  aim here is just to give the development of the free and autonomous will an 
alternative historical account that emphasises different  aspects of it that are not 
captured in Korsgaard’s account. Specifically, I wish to untangle the notion of the will 
from a sense of triumphalist necessity that  comes across in her account - the sense of 
the idea of autonomy having won over all rival accounts by  virtue of its essential 
philosophical merit. Instead, I wish to show that the idea of autonomy can be seen to 
have developed as a dominant ethical idea in the West in reaction to very specific 
situated demands of the times. If so, then the measure of the value of a practical 
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identity  can also be taken to be its ability  to account for the more particular and 
immediate demands of our situation, rather than its mere ability  to answer an 
interlocutor asking the - ostensibly ahistorical - normative question, “why should I be 
moral?”
     Taylor also gives a history  of Western metaphysics of the self through 
philosophical writings beginning with Plato. However, in doing so, he explicitly states 
that he is not claiming that philosophers are always the drivers of thought, but only 
that they at least capture the mode and practices of thought at a time. Only at  times 
are a part  of what drives it forward (199-207). Philosophers are always part of the 
milieu in which they  live, and so capture the ages’ practices in their writings. 
However, ideas are not always driven by philosophers, and what drives any idea, 
including the idea of the autonomous self, are not  only philosophical concerns but 
other practical demands and thoughts of the time. The development of the notion of 
the autonomous will is therefore not a strictly philosophical one. In this way, Taylor 
gives us an alternative genealogy of the autonomous will that draws on different 
features from those captured by Korsgaard’s account.
     Taylor also begins at Plato, a move which he notes to be already controversial as it 
is also already a shift from views of the self prior to Plato (a break examined in 
greater detail in Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue). He states Plato’s moral doctrine as 
simply  being, “we are good when reason rules, and bad when we are dominated by 
our desires.... What we gain through thought or reason is self-mastery. The good man 
is ‘master of himself’.... The mastery  of self through reason brings with it these three 
fruits: unity  with oneself, calm and collected self-possession” (115-6). What we get 
with this soon-to-be-dominating worldview are several features of a self. Firstly, the 
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self - understood as a soul - is in principle a single unitary locus. Secondly, this locus 
is constant. Thirdly, this locus is rational, that is to say that it is driven by thought. 
What we have is a picture of the self as a reasoning animal, using reason to guide his 
actions in the world around him.
     The Platonic view of the self was then assimilated into Christian thought, in large 
part through the work of Augustine. However, its assimilation brought with it a 
change in how it  was conceived. For it brought about a shift in direction, where the 
emphasis was shifted from outer to inner (129). In the old Platonic view, the self used 
reason to organise his actions out in the world. In the new Christian view, reason was 
now directed away from the world, organising actions for the sake of inner spirituality 
on the path to God. With this, one’s social relations, as well as one’s body, got further 
disassociated with one’s self. For with this a reflexive stance developed - take care of 
your self for the self is the way to God. The central importance of this reflexivity is 
evident in that this reflexivity  became the new grounds of certainty of truth; where 
certainty was now conceived of in the first-person perspective as evidenced in the 
Augustinian cogito. 
     The next  shift was the Cartesian one, where Descartes captured the shift of the 
moral source of values into us (143). For under the pressures of a new mechanistic 
worldview, one that denied a natural teleological order to the world, the account of the 
self changed yet again. Previously, the good was thought to exist wholly  outside of 
the self and the self only directed itself towards the good - whether to a natural cosmic 
order or towards God. Now, the good was said to exist in the self itself: we are good. 
God’s role thus changed from being the source and goal of our goodness to only being 
the guarantee that we are good. For God’s goodness guarantees that he created a good 
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universe where we are each internally  good. Understanding the good is then 
understanding what is good about ourselves. The mode of enquiry was thus shifted to 
one of radical reflexivity  - where what matters is a first-personal point-of-view about 
ourselves. We began the enquiry into what we are.
     Taking this stance of radical reflexivity allowed different modes of considering 
who we actually are. Pushing this valuing of reason in line with other prevalent 
scientific modes of reasoning at  the time got us the Lockean Punctual Self - a self 
freed from all subjective features. For as Descartes pushed us into radical subjectivity, 
where first-personal reasoning became the grounds of certainty, Locke pushed us into 
radical objectivity. Reason was taken to be disengaged reason stripped of all particular 
subjective features. That is to say, we should consider ourselves as a self amongst 
other selves, no different from any  other, and look for common features amongst all 
selves. In other words, we take the self to be an object and a natural being that follows 
laws like any other natural object in a Newtonian universe (164). So not only was the 
nature of enquiry  radically first-personal, but the mode of conducting it involved 
treating the self in an objectifying third-personal manner. 
      Led in part by the successes of an instrumental and functional science as well as a 
new commercial economy, reflections of the self in the age of Enlightenment took 
place in a new practical age. The best explanations became functional ones. So in 
reflecting upon what  we are, the philosophy  of the day ended up focussing on the 
ordinary  and natural - production and reproduction, that is to say labour and sex (211). 
Hence, evident amongst the decrees of the day  are denouncements of ascetic 
tendencies, the increasing rejection of a special elect priesthood and the 
pronouncement that God endorsed enjoyment. For as God had given us the evident 
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ability  to enjoy, and we enjoy enjoyment, so we should make use of this ability. Views 
of God commanding us to do otherwise were denounced as being induced by pride 
(222). Hence, ethical sources commanding us against our ultimate self-enjoyment 
were denied.
     What was taken to be evidence of our enjoyment were experiences and sentiments. 
For these, in line with the empirical spirit of the age, are observable. However, this 
way of thinking generates a prima facie problem since we also have sentiments that 
command us against our immediate sensual enjoyments - the moral sentiments. These 
had to be explained. Remaining consistent with the preferred metaphysics of the age, 
explanations of these moral sentiments were still explained eventually  in terms of 
final enjoyment: they  contribute to our eventual earthly good, for example giving us 
orderly  societies. This was seen in the moral sense and moral sentiment theories of 
Hutchenson and Hume (260). They claimed that while it may  not be immediately and 
obviously evident, the moral sentiments eventually promote our own interests and 
give us greater enjoyment. So the ultimate source of moral justification remained 
within this radically reflexive self.
     However, the stance of radical reflexivity  also allowed for a different mode of self-
conception. This involves not taking up a third-personal perspective but instead 
involves further introspection. Deep self-introspective reveals to us our own 
particularity, one felt so intensely that it seems unlikely to be subsumed under 
universal descriptions. This is a self that rejects natural laws and focusses on each 
individual’s own being. This view was epitomised by Montaigne, who promoted the 
Platonic features of unity, calm and collected self-possession, but claimed that  they 
are achieved only in negotiation with the different features in different beings. Each 
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person is the particular source of his identity, and though all aim for collected self-
control, it is done in line with a diverse originality that Montaigne took as the human 
condition (182). While antithetical to the Lockean punctual self, this view still arose 
from the shared understanding of us being radically reflexive.
     Montaigne’s deep-introspection and focus on originality, combined with 
Hutchenson and Hume’s focus on sentiments, gave us the influential writings of 
Rousseau. Rousseau re-interpreted the sentiments to be deeply significant inner 
voices. The inner voice now does not only just recognise what is good in ourselves, 
but it defines what is good. Rousseau gave unprecedented value to the capacity of our 
inner voice to determine good. For it is with Rousseau that  we get the idea that we can 
know from the impulses of our own being what is significant, and that “our ultimate 
happiness is to live in conformity with this voice, that is, to be entirely 
ourselves” (362). With Rousseau, we find the suggestion that our inner nature is the 
sole source of normativity. It  was no longer just what justifies, explain or merely 
recognises when and why something is valuable. Now, it  was taken to be what makes 
something valuable.
     It is here that we see all the pieces fall in place for Kant to develop his account of 
autonomy as a source of values. Kant took Rousseau’s account of freedom, our ability 
to act in line with our own inner nature, to ground value. He thus took a thread of 
radical subjectivity that developed from Descartes to Montaigne and to Rousseau. 
However, he also borrowed the other thread leading to the radical objectivity of 
Locke, with its emphasis on regular causalities and laws. So persons, if they  are to be 
enactors of valuable actions, are legislators. To follow a law is to follow reasons, 
which must not only be reasons for me but  for all other agents. Kant thus gave us an 
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account of autonomous freedom that sees such freedom as being “in a life whose 
normative shape is somehow generated by rational activity” (364). It  is this freedom 
and self-determination that was taken to be the dignity  of human beings, and which 
has become definitive of humanity in the Western tradition.
     At this point, I have reconstructed through Taylor a single, coherent, linear story 
about how the notion of the autonomous will came about. One last aspect that I would 
like to highlight is the evidence that this was not achieved without opposition. We 
already saw some opposition between the Lockean punctual self and Montaignean 
introspective self with regards to which aspect of the self was central to ethical 
enquiry. However, ultimately, all these accounts were consistent with, and led us to, a 
law-centric, harmonising self. Yet, while never becoming a dominant strands of 
thought in their own rights, threads explicitly rejecting such an understanding existed 
and exist alongside the dominant model. These are the views that the dominant view 
is too restrictive, deadening and routinised. Such complaints, not systematically 
integrated, were most emphatically  raised by more recent theorists like Lyotard and 
Foucault (456-72). 
Accounting for the Autonomous Will - Comparing the Two Accounts
     The development of the autonomous will in Taylor’s account suggests that, unlike 
that seen in Korsgaard’s account, the entrenchment and justification of the 
autonomous will did not develop as a response to a central unchanging philosophical 
question. Instead, it  developed progressively  by integrating different views of the self 
found in each given time and these views did not in turn develop through analyses of 
their philosophical merits but developed in line with available thoughts and practices. 
The concept of the self is therefore responsive to the demands and widespread 
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assumptions of a given time. The success of Newtonian science informed atomistic 
features of the Lockean self. The emphasis on production in an age of commerce and 
industry informed hedonistic features of the Humean self. The philosophical rightness 
of a view therefore shifts in reaction to the thoughts and practices of an age. If the 
demands of the time changes, then the adequacy of the view changes.
     This is not  to say, however, that a view of the self comes out in each age in a 
wholly novel fashion without reference back to previous understandings of the self. 
For each successive account of the self comes out of the previous account. What 
happens is that each successive view is a modification and extension of an older view. 
The Augustinian view developed from the Platonic view and the Cartesian view from 
the Augustinian view. This is because a notion of the self develops against the 
backdrop of social practices and there is continuity  of practices over time that are 
likewise reflected in the development of the idea of the self. Putting together an idea 
of the self is not a wholly conscious, self-creative activity. Rather, it is done in line 
with the demands of the times, and the times do not change so dramatically. There is a 
history to history, and if so, there is also a history to selfhood that has it connect up 
across time.
     Neither can we desire to just re-invent our identity, because it is the setting of a 
conception against the previous and existing framework that gives normative force to 
a conception of self. As Taylor notes, “when a given constellation of self, moral 
sources, and localization is ours, that means it is the one from within which we 
experience and deliberate about our moral situation. It cannot but  come to feel fixed 
and unchallengeable, whatever our knowledge of history and cultural variation may 
lead us to believe” (112, author’s emphasis). It  is only  because there is some 
68
continuity  with an existing view of the self that my self has value. Thus, even though 
practical identities are contingent, they  are not easily  escapable once we have them. In 
fact, we need to develop from them, rather than simply deny  them altogether in order 
for them to be valuable at all. Hence, an existing account can feel necessary  until we 
have a modified alternative.
     What we get putting the two accounts together is a new understanding of the 
appropriate justification of the autonomous will as generating morality. Firstly, we see 
that the account is not an ahistorical or transhistorical one, as we might suppose given 
Korsgaard’s analysis. The account, and the justification of it, has a history that  gives it 
value by granting it widespread endorsement. However, the endorsement is not just 
one that explains generally  why we should be moral. Rather, it  is an endorsement of 
how well it fits our particular current situation and explains why we should be moral 
right now. Taylor himself suggests that this is the case. Even though he notes the 
concept of the self changed over time, he claims that a watershed moment has passed 
where we now cannot but think in terms of an ethics of dignity  and equal respect for a 
valuable autonomous will (65-7). The philosophical justification of the will is 
understood as one for now.
     Secondly, we see the value of the autonomous will, and even the autonomous will 
itself, to also be contingent upon the way in which we account for the will. What 
giving two different genealogies of the will shows is that in different accounts, we 
highlight and emphasis different qualities to create different values. The value that we 
attach to the will emerge only  from the way  in which we tell the story  of the will as a 
valuable practical identity. For within Taylor account’s, what we value is a happening 
embedded in a history  and a framework of understanding. In contrast, with 
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Korsgaard’s account, what we see is its value in how it can persuade us to be moral 
by first respecting ourselves and then extending that same respect of outwards to other 
beings than us. What is valued is therefore different in each different account, and we 
offer different accounts for different reasons since we offer them to try to account for 
different concerns.
     A final thing to highlight is that the Taylor account admits of counter-values to that 
of the autonomous will, something that Korsgaard’s account does not. For in 
highlighting that a conception of the self only  emerges by piecing together existing 
strands of demands for a self in a particular time, Taylor cannot ignore the value of 
the strands and demands that do not cohere with, or are even antagonistic to, the 
autonomous will. Korsgaard, on the other hand, outrightly denies these strands of 
value in her account of normativity, and even labels them pernicious. It is precisely 
because there are anti-rational strands that we need the autonomous will as a source of 
normativity to defeat these strands. This assumption is the very beginning of the 
Korsgaard genealogy. In this way too, the nature of the value that  the autonomous will 
is seen to give us is determined by  how we structure our story of the sources of 
normativity.
     At this point, I would like to make an assertion about two sources of normativity 
that are accepted as valuable today, but are not captured in the model of the 
autonomous will as a totalising and governing conception of practical identity. They 
are: a need to recognise a plurality of values and a need to recognise our creativity 
and originality. These are the same considerations hinted at by  Taylor as running 
counter to the autonomous will, and these are ones that cannot be contained or 
cohered with such a will because their very motivation runs counter to it. For amongst 
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the plurality of values will include accounts that structure the world in a way that 
leaves no space for the will, like Rosemont’s account. And originality  would also at 
times include the value of deliberately violating the demands of regularity made by 
the lawful will. Hence, the autonomous will model is alone not able to meet the 
demands for identity today.
     For that reason, we need a new account of practical identity. However, given what 
I have demonstrated through the examination of the two genealogies, it  is not possible 
to simply invent a practical identity from scratch. Practical identities face a bi-
directional pull in their development. First, they need to be responsive to the demands 
of a time, which I suggest to presently include the demands of recognising plurality 
and originality. However, there is also the pull that it  still grows out from an existing 
account of practical identity in order to give it a sense of significance. In order to be a 
plausible account, a model of practical identity must not only be able to handle the 
new demands, but must also connect to an existing story  of practical identity. Like 
Korsgaard showing how each successive model of practical identity  leads us to the 
notion of the autonomous will, we need an account showing how we can move on 
from that will.
Developing on Korsgaard’s Genealogy of the Ethical Self
     I suggest that it is ironicaly the development of the autonomous will that leads us 
to one recognition of there being alternative sources of values and normativity. For 
recognising and respecting oneself as the originator of values leads us to recognising 
and respecting others as the originator of values as well. Such a respect involves 
letting individuals organise their lives in different ways without coercing them to act 
in one way or another, since such is the rightful and consistent attitude we should hold 
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towards other originators of value. In allowing this, it therefore should, in line with 
the consistency that it value, also allow to an extent the validity  of modes of living 
one’s live lawlessly. (Note that this does not  mean immorally, but rather living a 
Rosemont-type account which does not admit of laws.) It should recognise even these 
because what it  claims that what we respect is not the law itself but the original source 
of that law - the normative self.
     It would thus be coercive, and inconsistent with the spirit of Korsgaard’s account, 
to tell everyone else that they  can follow any account they  want so long as it is a 
lawlike account. Instead, if we want to have people act  in line with moral accounts, 
we should hold out these accounts not to coerce others to adopt them, but rather to 
attract others to them. What else, after all, is Korsgaard doing but attracting us with 
her account? Thus, by following the account of autonomy, we return to attractive 
models of ethics. Respecting autonomy shifts our ethical metaphysics from an ethics 
of coercion back to an ethics of attraction, since it requires that we enter into an ethics 
voluntarily, and such voluntariness must allow for us rejecting it. The chance to reject 
it opens up the validity of also considering alternative modes of accounting for 
practical identity. Moral identity  remains a live option, and certainly  has its charms. 
Still, we  may now question whether it is really the most charming option there is.
     At this point, I hope that I have done enough to undermine the necessity of moral 
identity. I have achieved this by first making a set of distinctions that let me open up a 
space where moral identity  is no longer necessary. As an issue of practical identity, 
with practical identity distinguished from agential identity, I showed that it was not 
conceptually necessary to have practical moral identity and certainly not necessary to 
have it be privileged over all other practical identities. With an alternative feasible 
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account of practical identity, I showed that it  was not de facto necessary to have 
practical moral identity. Other live options, for instance Rosemont’s exist. With a 
revised historical account of practical identity, I showed that it  is time to have a new 
modified account of practical identity. I have therefore opened up a space in which we 
can consider narrative identity as a way of accounting for practical identity. That will 
be what I turn to in the next chapter.
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FOUR
A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF PRACTICAL IDENTITY
(ZEROING IN ON A NEW WAY OF DOING SO)
     Having opened up the space for a new conception of practical identity, I will now 
propose that narratives provide a good way of accounting for practical identity and 
put forth a case for what I will call narrative identity. As shown in previous chapters, 
an account of practical identity should be one that is responsive to contemporary 
demands and so emerges from these demands. It should also connect up to existing 
models of identity and so is not ahistorical. In addition, it should also be practically 
effectible as a model of practical accounting. In this chapter, I will therefore consider 
what I think are contemporary  demands on an account of practical identity  that need 
to be met. I will then show that a narrative account of practical identity is suited to 
meet those purposes. I will finally show that it is effective as a mode of accounting 
and that it is one that we can actually have and live today.
     The most urgent demands that our age places on any proposed account of practical 
identity  are that it be responsive to a plurality of values and especially respond to the 
values of creativity and fun. Narrative identity, as the conception of ourselves as loci 
of different narrative strands, best suits these demands since it  provides resources to 
engage different sets of values. In addition, narrative identity meets other demands we 
make on practical identity. It allows our self-construction to be deeply meaningful and 
it is also able to capture other key features that we presently  value in ourselves - our 
temporality, our sociality and our fragmented nature. Narrative identity also gives us 
sufficient structure for ethical guidance by  valuably telling us how to act. Most 
importantly, it is a mode of self-conception and guidance that is practically effectible 
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as it is a mode that we, as bearers of practical identity, have historically  engaged in, 
notably in writing fiction, and can be seen to still engage in right now.
Contemporary Demands on Practical Identity Accounting
     As already noted, one key demand to be met is that we at least  attempt to sincerely 
recognise and affirm a plurality of different values. For the existence of a sincere and 
well-considered value, however conflicting with our own, gives us prima facie reason 
to try to recognise its worth. Even within the Western metaphysical tradition, there 
still remains deep fragmentation and contestation between different normative sources 
of the self. Taylor identifies these as being potentially  grouped under three broad 
categories: the theistic tradition found in appeals to God, the tradition of disengaged 
reason found in scientistic forms and a Romantic tradition that champions self-
expression to the point of a celebration of unbound anti-reason (495). Given that 
different histories and traditions legitimately give us plural values through their 
promoting a viable and longstanding ways of life, and these coexist and interact in 
society, we should try to recognise the different values each generates.
     This task is insufficiently performed by  accounts of value that see value stemming 
wholly from autonomous choice. Such accounts can recognise some kind of value in 
plurality. It might be suggested that having plural values is good because we want real 
choices to choose from, so these different values are important for the sake of giving 
real choice to autonomous choosers. So we should respect plurality of values because 
they  enable choice. However, values are valuable to those who have them because of 
how they are already present in a person’s life, whether chosen or not. Respecting a 
plurality  of values is to respect those values for themselves, whatever the source of 
their value, and not for the sake of some autonomous chooser behind them. The mere 
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tolerance as an extent of recognition offered by autonomy towards different values is 
not enough given the ubiquity and depth of the interactions between the different 
values found around us today.
     Moreover, the increasing importance of dialogue between Western and non-
Western traditions gives us impetus to recognise other sources of value, particularly 
those that do not  refer to an account of autonomy. For, first, seeing alternative ways of 
understanding different configurations of value leads us to doubt the sufficiency of the 
ones we have. Second, such dialogue appears to show up the inadequacy of the 
account of individual, autonomous, reasoning wills in handling modern practical 
problems. For example, Rosemont, in “Confucian Role Ethics” has argued for the 
poverty  of such conceptions in solving problems of global social justice. For if what 
ultimately  counts is individual autonomous freedom, their focussing on respect for 
free choices makes it  too easy to not help and not engage with beings distant from us. 
Given the merits of such arguments, we need new models of practical identity to 
enable and enrich such discussions.
     Associated with the recognition of plurality is a recognition of originality and 
creativity as a normative value. This is found in the language of radical self-
formation. Self-expression and creation is a fundamental source of normativity 
supporting Western moral metaphysics today. In fact, it is partly  this normativity that 
underlies Korsgaard’s account of the self as normative source. It is also a normativity 
recognised by Taylor in his discussion of the modern identity, particular in his 
recognising the modern good of unconstrained freedom (489). Self-authorship is 
recognised as a normative force in its own right and, today, we do see our practical 
selves both as authors of our selves and thus also authored subjects. Moreover, such 
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self-formation is valued not only for the form of self-authorship, but also of the 
substance - involving the varieties of self-expression through such authorship. A 
rejection of an ethics of coercion opens up even more room for such expression.
      An offshoot from this rejection of an ethics of coercion, as well as our willingness 
to recognise originality and creativity, is a greater willingness to endorse fun and play 
as ethical values to direct one’s life. This fun-lovingness is not alien to us, as evident 
through the history of literature. The contrariness of Sterne and Bolaño testify in part 
to this. This appreciation of fun is also insisted upon by some literary theorists. For 
example, it  underpins Jane Adamson’s critique of overly serious modes of moral 
attention and enquiry. Adamson criticises the study of literature by some moral 
philosophers who earnestly try to find in literature some neat moral guidance. She 
sees such philosophers to miss out on the valuable untidiness of a literary  text - an 
open-ended, curious and imaginative enquiry that is not necessarily directed by 
further and loftier goals (“Against Tidiness”, 84-110). Admitting the value of self-
authorship gives us more resources to admit the value of sheer superfluous fun.
     The two demands of authorship and plurality do come together but also come 
apart. It is because we value self-authorship that we recognise the possible result of a 
plurality  of outcomes and so value plurality as well. However, with valuing plurality, 
we also have to confront accounts of identity  that deny or devalue self-authorship, as 
found in Rosemont’s condemnation of individualism. So the two values do come 
apart. Yet, they  undeniably  must both be met given our need for valuable practical 
identities. As Taylor himself notes, “as our public traditions of family, ecology, even 
polis are undermined or swept away, we need new languages of personal resonance to 
make crucial human goods alive for us again” (513). However, structures of what it 
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means to have a valuable identity  constrains both these new values as well. As I 
previously  noted, our new accounts must still have resonance with past accounts to be 
meaningful ones.
     So both within and without Western tradition, a new form of accounting for 
practical identity is desired. This is due to the incapability  of existing accounts to 
handle new demands. Centrally, these are that of recognising multiple sources of 
value, as the Korsgaardian will-centric account fails to do, and also that of 
recognising self-authorship as a source of value, which Rosemontian accounts are less 
apt to do. However, in admitting these new demands, the new form of accounting 
should not fail to cohere with older traditions and end up unrecognisable. Such an 
account should be more capable of handling both multi-vocality  and self-forming 
normative potential while still preserving sufficient unity and recognisability to those 
who are giving and receiving the account. I believe that narrative accounting is 
capable of meeting all of these varied and conflicting demands, giving us a coherent 
and useful method of self-conception.
Narrative Identity
     In the prologue, I defined a narrative as a collection of various plots into a single 
meaningful whole. I also defined a plot as a mode of explanation with the following 
features. First, it  has a sequential order of events with a beginning, a middle and an 
end. There is a succession of relevant events in and over time. Second, such a manner 
of sequencing generates a kind of meaningful coherence where earlier events are seen 
to cause future events. Third, such accounts are given from one party to another, a 
teller to a listener, with the intention of achieving a purpose on the part of the teller, 
and aims to achieve that purpose based on an understanding of the motivations and 
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expectations of the listener. Fourth, such accounting allows that for any set of plot 
events, each account may  be incomplete so a multiplicity of such accounts are 
possible. Finally, these are accounts that can connect up not only past events, but also 
future events.
     Narrative identity is the conception of ourselves as loci of different narrative 
strands. It claims that our practical identity  is made up by each of us being a character 
in various different narratives - some told by us and some told by others. Crucially, 
we are not always the central subject of the stories being told. Sometimes we are a 
minor character in another person’s story, at other times, we are a major player and 
often, especially  in our own, we are the protagonist. Conversely, many different 
persons can figure in my story  to greater and lesser degrees as well. In these various 
accounts, different aspects of our selves are represented, changing according to the 
story’s demands. The only general demand is that the manner in which I am 
represented is recognised as emerging from a proper mode of accounting in terms of 
the features listed above. (I describe how my account differs from other accounts of 
narrative identity in Appendix A).
     Conceiving of ourselves with narrative identity is not conceiving of ourselves as a 
single complete narrative, but seeing ourselves as loci of different narratives. As such, 
what is demanded of by narrative identity  is that we are systematically directed 
towards various plot features that we find important for practical identity, and 
consider ourselves in relation to those features. It  tells us to focus on our actions as 
teleological. It tells us to be searching for meaningful coherence to our actions; a 
coherence that can come in a number of ways. It tells us that  such coherence must be 
shareable and communicable to both ourselves and others - the meaning of our actions 
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should not be opaque to us. It tells us to be willing to see a multiplicity  of ways of 
finding meaning in our lives, in line with a plurality  of values. And it tells us that our 
conceptions of ourselves need not merely be retrospective justification of actions, but 
also possibly be projections of our goals and ourselves into the future.
     And there is no need to integrate all of these narrative strands into a single 
overarching narrative; there is no need for there to be a mega-narrative that combines 
all our individual narratives.  This is true in two sense. First, all the narratives about 
me as an actor need not be integrated in a single narrative of myself. Second, all the 
narratives about all actors need not be integrated in a single gargantuan narrative. For 
practical identity is an identity that is brought  up in the moments of ethical 
contemplation. In these situations, a particular question emerges about who we are, 
and only  in reaction to these questions do we need to give an account. We need not 
appeal to a single overall grand practical identity, but only to the features relevant to 
the question at hand. If so, then thinking of narrative identity  as a practical identity 
would mean that we need not think of a single grand narrative identity in any way, but 
only call up the relevant narrative for that situation at a given time.
     It  is this feature that gives us a first way in which narrative identity  is able to 
preserve a plurality of accounts. For by not requiring such integration, it remains open 
to a variety  of values and ways of valuing. It accepts that there may be multiple ways 
of putting together a coherent and meaningful structure to a set of actions and tells us 
to be open to these various ways. This is permitted even if the accounts that are given 
contradict each other, for it allows that any set of human events can be put  together in 
different meaningful configurations; though if there is a serious contradiction, it is 
worthwhile to carefully re-examine the contradictory  accounts and their assumed 
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premises. However, it  does not require a grand overarching account without 
contradiction, accepting that piecemeal accounts that work in particular situations will 
do. Narrative identity is fine with partial answers, answering only to demands being 
called into question at the point of time.
     Moreover, narrative identity  also captures for us the nature of authorship in 
selfhood. For it takes our natures both as authors and authored subjects quite literally. 
As narratives have plotters, so our self-narratives have plotters as well. These plotters, 
however, are not just our selves. We are not the sole authors of our stories, for our 
nature as the subject of stories makes us amenable to having our stories told by 
someone else. For we tell our stories to be understood by others, and others can 
correct our stories for us. It is only the intersubjective agreement, between teller and 
listener, about the validity of a certain story about ourselves that generates a basis for 
stable self-understanding. Yet, it is also not the case that only we originate our own 
stories to be corrected by others, for others can give stories about us which we must 
then validate or contest. So narrative identity  agrees with radical self-authorship, but 
it also extends such authorship to others also being authors of your tale.
     Thus, the two main demands that I suggest are requested for today are met by an 
account of narrative identity. In addition, the other features of narrative identity go on 
to capture other features that we would admit to be valuable in an account of practical 
identity  today. To begin with, its features of end-directedness and a meaningful 
coherence to our actions explain our desire to take ourselves and our actions seriously. 
It is not just  random self-authorship that is wished for but  coherent and meaningful 
authorship. Narrative identity, with its emphasis on these very qualities captures that. 
As a consequence of doing so, it also secures the Platonic demand of ourselves being 
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unitary and collected possessors of our selves. Admittedly, such meaningful 
coherence does not always grant us the calmness that Plato wants, for we can be 
passionate in our meaningful identities as well, but then again, it is arguable that we 
do in fact want that much calm in our lives.
     Second, narrative identity takes seriously the temporality of our practical identity. 
For it can conceive of our actions taking on a meaningful story over time in the same 
unchanging practical identity. An account of the practical agent as a moral agent only 
refers to a faculty of choosing and so does not capture the meaningfulness of our 
subsequent action. It  is concerned only  with the fact that we choose. An account of the 
practical agent as a role-centric agent  only refers to the roles, and given that the role 
we have change with time, our whole identities change with them. Yet, narrative 
identity  tells us of how we can be a single meaningful actor even through all these 
changes given that we are in a single narrative. So when I become a husband and then 
a father, being in a single narrative still makes me the same practical agent. Similarly, 
for that reason, I am interested in being healthy now for the sake of my future, 
because that future is mine in that it extends from the same narrative.
     A different aspect of this temporality, the difference in judgement of a life’s value 
due to a difference in a life narrative, is well captured in an example given by David 
Velleman. In this example, we are asked to consider two different lives. One life 
begins poorly  but has an upward trend - a trouble youth, early adult setbacks and 
struggles, satisfaction in middle age and peaceful retirement. The other begins at 
heights but  has a downward trend - a blissful youth, triumphs in early adulthood but 
followed by disasters that lead to misery in old age. These lives contain equal sums of 
momentary  well-being, but it strikes most of us that the former life is better lived than 
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the latter (“Wellbeing and Time”, 58). It is because the former follows a broad 
narrative structure that we see to be better than that of the latter. Thus, an account of 
narrative identity captures the value of a narrative structure itself - the relational 
structure of one’s life events give us value.
     Thirdly, narrative identity captures the very deep sociality of our being. For we are 
not only the authors of our own narratives but are also the authors of others, and vice 
versa. I am part of another person’s meaningful identity and others are a part of mine. 
All accounts of narration are also offered with the capability of being understood by 
other persons, and so all our narrations are accountable to each other as authors. This 
makes my practical identity  and actions subject to very  deep criticism by others and it 
is through negotiations with others that I become a richly and rightly meaningful 
being. For example, in pushing a man off a cliff I may conceive of myself as a hero. 
For having done so, I may choose to describe the man as a villain. Yet, others may 
disagree and give me a counter-narrative in which I am the villain of the piece. It  is 
thus a case where the right story can be contested if it needs to be contested.
     Moreover, the sociality of narratives also captures another feature that we 
recognise of our practical selves - we are fragmented beings with different stories to 
tell in different scenarios. The nature of our sociality is such that  it is almost certain 
that each self is going to figure in more than one narrative, and in more than one tale 
told by different people. For I will figure in someone else’s story  as a friend, a best 
friend, a parent, a part of a statistic of persons living in South-East Asia and so on. So 
we will have multiple accounts of our selves being given at any one time. The very 
pluralistic nature of narrative identity captures this feature that we find about our 
practical selves. For again, it is the very nature of narratives that characters and things 
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in a narrative are able to play different parts and be in different plot strands given the 
many different perspectives that can possibly  be, and sometimes are, adopted around a 
series of events that are put together as narratives.
     Narratives also allow for different modes of accounting, even ones that are 
somewhat contradictory, for the self within a narrative. It is possible, and in fact 
common-sensical, for example to see ourselves as both autonomous wills and holders 
of roles. While each of these would exclude each other, as argued in Chapter 2, they 
can both figure in the same narrative self. Allowing for this in turn opens us up to the 
possibility of possessing more incommensurable modes of identity. For example, as 
proposed by Amelie Rorty, we can also think of ourselves as figures, characters, souls 
and archetypes. We can think of ourselves in all these different  ways when we are in 
different narratives, at  different times in a narrative or even at the same time in a 
narrative. Thus, thinking of ourselves in terms of narrative identity holds forth these 
additional pluralistic modes of self-conception, modes that we are already familiar 
with and identify ourselves with.
     The combination of all these various particularistic features of narrative identity 
combine to once again draw our attention to, and capture the value of, our pluralistic 
and fragmentary  practical natures. There is thus at least a three-fold capturing of this 
pluralism. First, it is open to non-integration of multiple perspectives and narratives 
given by a single author into a single whole. Second, it  is open to multiple authorship, 
allowing for multiple narrators to give an account of the same set of events. Third, it 
broadly  allows for the interaction of these numerous features and have them combine 
in a large number of ways. Thus, narrative identity captures our creative and 
fragmentary  selves. The web of narratives put together gets us a coherent, if 
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sometimes messy, account of ourselves that takes into account  all of these 
fundamental values and so is a most authentic and fulfilling way of understanding our 
selves today.
The Limits of Narratives as a Guide to Action
     It may be a worry  that narrative identity does not provide us with sufficient 
guidance for our actions. For, given that there are so many different ways to put 
together a narrative, we might worry that we can come up with a narrative for any 
action we choose. In response to such a contention, it is sufficient to reply as quite 
simply  false that we can turn anything into a narrative. For, as I note in the prologue, 
narratives demand a meaningful coherence that must be meaningful in the light of the 
accounting practices of the community of narrators at a given point in time. There are 
thus strong grounds for guidance - you have to act in a way that is valuably coherent 
to another narrator. Moreover, as already mentioned, the deep sociality of narratives 
mean that any narrative you do give can be questioned by another narrator, and a 
narrator is urged to respond to the challenge and explain why his given narrative is the 
better one.
     What counts as a proper mode of accounting is wholly socially determined. It is 
determined in two different ways. First, the elements in a particular narrative must be 
seen as appropriate elements for that narrative. If, in a narrative, I am seen as a 
dignified human being, then I cannot be taken as a mere object. The elements for a 
narrative are determined by the narrative itself. So certain beings that we identify as 
human being today cannot uncontroversially be taken as mere tools of production and 
treated in a manner not befitting human beings. Second, what even counts as a 
narrative depends on social practices. A random string of actions that are not 
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recognised by  anyone to hang together in any appropriate causal way would not be a 
narrative even if I insisted on it being so. For example, Joe killing someone because 
the grass is green today  would not be considered a good sequence of events and so 
cannot be taken as a plausible narrative.
     However, while the features that a narrator appeals to are the existing socially 
accepted models of narration at a time, these standards are not in themselves 
sacrosanct and unchallengeable. It is possible and legitimate that a narrator should 
chose to challenge and contest the existing modes of narration. However, in doing so, 
he must  do so intelligibly. He needs to reference the historically available resources 
and requirements of a given time, using concepts that are available to him and 
responding to the given demands of the time. He then has to show that existing 
models of narration are insufficiently  relevant to current social demands, and so need 
to be changed. In doing so, he can shift the model of narration and then give meaning 
to the narrative he intends to give under that new model. Nonetheless, it should be 
clear that just because this can be done does not then mean that everything is 
permissible. For ultimately, the account must be intelligible.
     It is this social understanding of what a narrative is, in terms of the demands of its 
intelligibility  and meaningful coherence through time, that narratives not only give us 
explanations and justifications for past and current actions, but also give us directions 
for future ones. For we can ask ourselves about the nature of the narrative that we find 
ourselves, seeing ourselves in the middle of a narrative and then following it to its 
causal end. The demand for a narrative coherence to our actions therefore gives us 
reasons to act in different ways. The narrative under which we choose to recognise 
ourselves opens up and directs the various paths we can take from a given point 
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within that narrative. As stated already, narrative identity involves a systematic 
process of looking at a number of features that we take to be important for our 
actions. It is unlikely that looking at these features would fail to give us any direction 
at all.
     Still, how we decide to go for one kind of narrative over another would come 
down to how attractive that narrative is after sufficient deliberation, So, it does not 
compel us to take it  up as a narrative we must endorse, but only attempts to convince 
us that it is a better narrative than another. Moreover, it is a form of practical identity 
that is focussed on the resources we have available. It is focussed not on a perfect and 
ideal action, but rather the right action to perform right now given available data. This 
is not to say  that in selecting one action over another, our chosen narrative cannot be 
amended or later rejected. For whatever narrative we choose still depend on 
contingent facts about the world, and discovering new facts or amending 
misunderstandings can have us correct  our narrative choice. Likewise, as already 
noted, our narratives are open to challenge by  others and in doing so, they can make 
us change our narrative course as well.
     There is no necessarily right answer as to which narrative would be the right one to 
adopt. For narrative identity is one where the choice of one narrative over another is 
made because of the attractiveness of that option, and not because we are ultimately 
compelled to tell the narrative we are telling. It might feel compulsive if the attractive 
quality of the narrative is so strong that we cannot help but  want to tell that tale. 
However, what makes it compulsive is not some sense of obligation or some sense of 
coercion, but rather a sense that this is the most desired choice to make. Someone 
might suggest that this is insufficient guidance and that we require a much stronger 
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coercive sense to determine precisely  what it is that we should do. Yet, I think that 
such a worldview is deeply unattractive and unnecessary. As such, it  is the onus of 
advocate of coercion to explain why such restrictive guidance is required or even 
possible.
Realising Narrative Identity as a Practical Identity
     So I have shown that narrative identity  is responsive to the demands of practical 
identity  today, most notably  our creative and fragmentary practical demands. I have 
also shown that narrative identity is sufficiently action-guiding and is therefore a 
useful practical identity today. However, these two features are as yet insufficient to 
demonstrate that narrative identity  is actually realisable as a practical identity. In 
addition to the above, I still have to show that it  is a familiar enough model of 
theorising about the self to be adopted practically and that it bears a connection with 
current ways of self-conception. I also have to show that it  can actually be practically 
carried out - that it is actually  possible to have narrative form guide our action in 
some way  and yield a meaningful and coherent product. So in this final section, I will 
show that narrative identity  has, in fact, always been one of the most attractive models 
of practical identity, and that it is also coherent as a way of theorising.
     It is obvious that narratives are a familiar form to us. Simply, if you found the 
characteristics listed in the prologue familiar, then you are familiar with narratives. 
Narratives are a common form of fiction writing and most novels in the Western 
tradition are thought to be narratives. If narratives are a recognisable form of fiction 
writing in novels, then narrative identity  is a familiar form of practical self-accounting 
as we recognise selves in novels. We perform ethical criticism with and through 
literature, as argued from thinkers like Aristotle in the Poetics through to 
88
contemporary  practitioners of ethical criticism such as Wayne Booth in The Company 
We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction. What enables such acts of reading to be done is the 
awareness that narratives can and have been taken to be investigations of selfhood. 
The persistence of such readings is then, I take it, sufficient testimony to its 
acceptability as a form of self-accounting.
     It is difficult to imagine how else I can argue for the acceptable coherence of 
narrative as a mode of accounting for our practical identity. For, like any other 
account of practical identity, it is an instance where the proof of the pudding is 
ultimately  in the tasting. One can only see an account of practical identity proving to 
be rich, coherent, and attractive through the living out of it. Until it is done, it is hard 
to see its potential realisability in other ways. One has to see narrative identity 
produce actual practical action, and have that action read and understood by others to 
be meaningful and coherent. It  requires an actual carrying out of the activity to assert 
such certainty. It is therefore my hope to have done a part of that activity through this 
very thesis. For, this thesis itself tries to enact those values by  trying as far as possible 
to follow the structure of a narrative in achieving coherence, and with each chapter 
emphasising both creativity and plurality. 
     The prologue began with authorship and the self. Chapter 1 showed the value of 
plurality  gained by  emphasising different  values in an account. Chapter 2 showed the 
value of plurality  gained by taking on different accounts. Chapter 3 showed the value 
of plurality gained by giving different histories of the same account. Chapter 4 
showed the value of responsiveness to a plurality  of demands. Each chapter took on 
different accounts and different styles of accounting. But each chapter structurally led 
on to the next and, I hope, meaningfully integrated all these various features into a 
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single coherent whole. So if my  thesis has been successful in conveying to you its 
meaning, and given that my thesis bears a narrative structure that  contributes to the 
conveyance, then narrative identity  is a realisable mode of practical accounting. All 
that is left to do is see this as not just being an account of practical identity  on paper, 
but an account of practical identity for real life.
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EPILOGUE
WRAPPING UP THE ACCOUNT OF NARRATIVE IDENTITY
(SETTING UP THE STAGE FOR AN ETHICS OF NARRATIVE IDENTITY)
     I end this account at  the ending, but also in medias res. Both of this is, in some 
sense, necessarily not the case. For it is a tautology that we end not in the middle of 
an account but at the ending. But in a different sense, we need not end at the ending 
because we can re-tell the account. Furthermore, since there is no necessary beginning 
and different beginnings affect their eventual destinations, we can end up at different 
endings. So we can never be said to be at the ultimate end of an account, for there is 
no place properly described as such. Endings are as much contrived as beginnings. To 
choose to end somewhere, we must be in a middle to shape and reshape the events 
that lead up to that moment in accounting as well as to forecast the events that are to 
come. So accounting is always more of an enacting activity  than a describing activity, 
and it thus necessary in an accounting that we are always in the middle, never ever 
only at the beginning or at the ending.
     It  is in light of this that I admit to the things that I took for granted in my account, 
assuming us, me and you the reader, to be in the same ‘middle’. I took for granted that 
we can understand the mode of narration required for narrative identity, and that in 
reading my narrative account, you, the reader, can understand it. I also just blankly 
asserted the demands that I feel a practical identity  is required to meet today. To be 
sure, I did quote other philosophers who have made similar assertions. However, 
neither these philosophers, nor I, give any  arguments for them. They are just 
observable givens in our current cultural landscape. There are no arguments to be 
given. I can only  sincerely say that I practically do feel these demands made upon us. 
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The argument that  I do give, however, is that  no other account can do any better, since 
they must make such assumptions too.
     The demands that I identified may not be universal ones. Demands for creativity 
and diversity of values may  not be considered important by many. Those raised in a 
univocal tradition of values, for example, may see no value in a diversity. It is thus 
important, I think, to emphasis the particular ‘middle’ that I come from and admit the 
inescapably  biographical nature of my narrative account. These demands are values of 
practical identity I feel to be especially  relevant as a citizen of a multicultural city, 
Singapore. It is precisely  within such an environment that I feel not only  the failure of 
the will-centric account of practical identity to explain the many  sources of value 
present, and also the attraction of trying to still find some value in those sources, such 
as long existing cultural traditions. It  is this very  specific bi-directional pull that 
motivates my account of practical identity, one that  I offer to suit my situation. I hope 
that it is an offering which also proves attractive enough for others.
     Yet, even though I have given reasons as to why others might feel themselves to be 
in the same situation as well, I do not outrightly offer my account as a full account 
that others might be compelled to take up in entirety. For I have suggested that 
motivations towards new modes of self-accounting may arise by  recognising the 
fragmented nature of values and rejecting obligation models of the ethical self. It 
would thus be contradictory to be attracted to another more complete and more 
compulsive mode of practical selfhood. Narrative identity is attractive precisely 
because it refuses to engage other selves that way. It does not offer a universal 
solution. Instead, my account of narrative identity can be better understood as my own 
individual process, viewing which another person, narrator or not, can take whatever 
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he likes from it and re-configure it accordingly. Admittedly, it presumes that such 
non-lawlike sharing of accounts is possible. Well, so it does.
     In terms of capturing a diversity of valuable sources, this work was one attempting 
to appreciate a breadth of material. This paper, again, attempted to capture that by 
keeping some sense of diffusion in its pages. It consciously integrated a large amount 
different material related to ethical identity, and then tries to put them together 
coherently. It  began with some answers already given about practical selfhood and 
then attempted to generate a coherent theme out of them by placing them in dialogue 
and contestation with one another. In this thesis, I argued for the value of such an 
approach - such open-endedness leaves us more creative, which is valuable. Yet, in 
another sense, this is always the case - we can only alway theorise from the material 
we know. In this sense, each theorist is again always in the middle. For this paper was 
only put together from the material that I have read. If I had read otherwise, I would 
think otherwise.
     This thesis follows from earlier work in my  undergraduate thesis, “Love and the 
Concept of the Person”, which first introduced narrative selves; and my future project 
following from this will be an examination of the ethical consequences and 
difficulties of such an account. For what I offer here is a presentation of the ripeness 
of narrative identity  as a model of practical identity, and also a brief schematic of how 
narrative identity works. What has not yet been fully explored are the normative 
consequences of the account. For given my suggesting that narratives carry normative 
force, it is important to now consider the relationship between narratives and 
normativity. It is a legitimate worry  that the radical creativity of narrativity might  be 
taken to justify a strongly relativistic position. For some philosophers have been taken 
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to advocate aesthetic moral theories that lead to moral nihilism. It  is a worry that 
narrative identity might lead us to the same. This is false.
     Yet, to fully respond to such a criticism, it is necessary  to consider ways in which 
we can analyse and compare different narratives to determine which account is better. 
How is it that without very  strict  standards, and confronted with a plurality  of 
different, and apparently incommensurable, values, we can still be able to judge 
between two or more accounts of identity. Also, it is worth seeing if we can find an 
even stronger response to reject the possibility of such moral nihilism emerging from 
the narrative account. Yet, all of that must be left for a later paper. What I offer here is 
a motivation for, and an account of, narrative identity that I hope makes it an 
attractive account of practical identity. For such attractive accounts are the ones that 
we need to look with greater interest today. So I end off in the middle, offering you, 
for now, an account of narrative identity that I hope we can appreciate and value, and 
continue to have and develop.
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APPENDIX A
OTHER STORIES OF IDENTITY
(CONTRASTS WITH OTHER WAYS OF DOING SO)
     This appendix aims to situate my own account of narrative identity  as practical 
identity  amongst several other existing account of identity. It  is therefore separate 
from the main thesis itself, which independently argues for my account of narrative 
identity, leaving aside this comparative task. Here, I will not provide comprehensive 
elaborations and critiques of each of these views, but only list some key ways in 
which my account differs from them. This appendix also serves to point out my debt 
to them as foils to my own account, for it is only through a dialogue with them that I 
could have developed my own account. I shall continue the use of my general 
taxonomy to classify these accounts, which the existing accounts of identity do not. 
By doing so, I will show that we gain new insights into the issues that these accounts 
of identity  are interested in through analysing identity with my distinctions. More 
specifically, we gain insight into the different ways in which we can interrogate 
existing accounts, as well as uncover a greater variety of roles that narrative identity 
can play. What is being contrasted here are therefore two things: my general method 
of accounting for identity and my account of narrative identity.
Different Ways of Accounting for Identity
     To begin with, I am not claiming that no philosopher has pointed out that we can 
conceive of identity in different  ways. What I am claiming is that  my manner of 
making distinctions is novel and useful in ways different from the other accounts. 
Korsgaard, as I have noted, does make a distinction between other accounts of 
identity  and her notion of practical identity. However, she does so to reject these other 
accounts of identity, for the sake of ethical theorising, in favour of her own 
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understanding of it. This will be made clear later when examining her criticism of 
Derek Parfit. This is also evident in Taylor’s own account of identity in Sources of the 
Self, where he criticises Parfit in a similar manner, taking it to be a deficient way of 
talking about identity.
     David Velleman, in yet another similar rejection of Parfit-type accounts, seems to 
engage in a similar move as Korsgaard and Taylor. However, in his introduction to 
Self to Self, Velleman does make further distinctions between different  modes of self-
representation. A self has different reflexive guises in which he highlights certain 
features - his self-image (name, identity number, how he looks), his metaphysical 
identity  (similar to my account of personal identity) and his autonomous agency 
(similar to my account of agential identity) (Self to Self, 1-15). Velleman’s claim is 
then not that there is a single and best way of thinking of identity, but rather that there 
are different ways of doing so according to different aims. His rejection of Parfit, 
which I will examine later, is not that his account is a bad one, but rather that it is 
inappropriate for discussions of ethics. Velleman’s approach, and distinction, thus 
bear some similarity to mine. However, they differ in at least two crucial ways. 
Firstly, my account of practical identity is not captured by  any analogous account in 
his set of distinctions. Secondly, my account of identity does not presuppose 
reflexivity and autonomy while his does. This is something which I will also discuss 
later, and which I will also show to be a major difference between my account and all 
the other accounts of identity (except Amelie Rorty’s) that I discuss here. 
     While, not necessarily being motivated by an issue of autonomy and control, 
David DeGrazia’s distinction between numerical and narrative identity also does 
presuppose both to be aspects of identities of the same agent, and both serving a 
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similar ethical aims - namely that which I have claimed to be the aim of personal 
identity  accounts. So while he maintains two distinct accounts of identity and does not 
fundamentally collapse them, they still differ from my own distinctions and serve 
different functions. I will also discuss this view later.
     Another philosopher who has noted different ways of approaching identity talk is 
Paul Ricoeur. In Oneself as Another, he points out that we use the terms ‘self’ and 
‘identity’ ambiguously, meaning both numerical identity and the identity of a self that 
carries out actions and is held responsible for them. He also notes the use of the world 
‘self’ to contain different semantic and pragmatic meanings and so makes further 
distinctions between ways of understanding the self. However, Ricouer eventually 
takes all of these ways to coincide upon the same identical being - they all talk about 
the same self. Each way of using the term ‘self’ is a way to refer to a different aspect 
of an individual. In contrast, I offer the view that the different ways of accounting are 
independent of each other, and that the self that emerges from each account need not 
be the same one that is referred to in another account. This has consequences for our 
different views of narrative identity, which I will discuss later.
    Finally, it is worth noting that Amelie Rorty  in “Literary Postscript” also gives us 
different interesting ways of talking about  identity  in different configurations - as 
characters, persons, figures, souls and so on. In each of these configurations, different 
qualities of the self are emphasised and brought to the forefront for different reasons 
and roles. For example, when talking of someone as a figure, we highlight his 
archetypal characteristics and ignore his life experiences and personal nuances. A 
figure gains his identity from the significance his characteristics play in an order of 
events. Rorty’s manner of distinguishing various modes of identity  is useful in the 
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more detailed examination of constructing narrative identities as practical identities, 
and should be discussed when considering the normativity  of narrative identity - how 
we can and how we should construct our narratives of selves. As my distinctions are 
meant to be more general in delineating practical identity and the other two 
accounting methods that I have discussed, her distinctions take place at a different 
level from my own and so are not pertinent to my discussion here. I thus do not 
discuss her again, and turn to comparing in detail my three ways of accounting and 
my narrative account with those proposed by others.
My Three Ways of Accounting for Identity
     The most general feature of my method of accounting for identity is the 
idiosyncratic way that I distinguish three distinct and independent ways of accounting 
for identity in relation to three different ethical concerns. As already explained, these 
are Personal Identity, Agential Identity and Practical Identity, which respectively 
answer to the questions “who am I that acts?”, “how do I act?”  and “how should I 
act?”  I begin without assuming that any  of the answers to any one of these questions 
will pick out the same features as an answer to a different identity  question. Instead, I 
suggest that expecting them to do so would lead to misanalysis. It  is in fact the 
presence of such misanalysis that  convinces me of the uniqueness of my  manner of 
making the distinctions.
     This is the case, for example, with Christine Korsgaard’s objection to Derek 
Parfit’s account of personal identity, and also David Velleman’s objection to Parfit-
like accounts of identity. Parfit’s argues that what matters with regards to personal 
identity  is sufficiently achieved by there being a weak connection between prior and 
latter states of being. He thus denies the need for there to be an essential set of 
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enduring features in us in order to met the ethical demands of personal identity (as I 
use the term). Korsgaard contests this. She points out that we do need such a set  of 
enduring features - an enduring unity of consciousness. This is because such a unity is 
required for what matters to autonomous agents. It  matters, for example, that a 
unifying set of features in an agent are not drastically changed against his will into a 
latter being that shares none of the former’s properties, for in that case, the 
autonomous agent would not recognise the resultant being as being the same person 
he formerly was. Korsgaard correctly indicates that in Parfit’s view, the being would 
still be said to be the same surviving person. She thus counts this as a point against 
Parfit’s analysis. (“Personal Identity  and the Unity  of Agency”, 363-98) Similarly, 
Velleman notes that  our concerns with survival involves our ability to “prefigure 
future experiences”, and Parfit-like accounts give no resources to capture this self-
intimacy with our actions and their consequences (“Self to Self”, 170-202). 
     However, theses argument simply fails to acknowledge that what matters for 
survival in the personal identity sense (as I use it) is not the same as what matters for 
free will and actions in the agential identity  sense. It fails to acknowledge that there is 
ethical value in being able to pick out a sense in which the person who has been 
drastically changed against his will still is the same person, and that others can 
identify him as such. For it fails to see the value of such third-personal recognition of 
a person in its overzealous concern with first-personal self-identification and self-
intimacy. By my distinction, Parfit-like accounts are still valuable as accounts of 
personal identity, if not workable as accounts of agential identity. Being able to 
distinguish between personal and agential identity, I am thus able to preserve all of 
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Korsgaard’s, Velleman’s and Parfit’s concerns, without rejecting any one of the their 
accounts.
     A similar misanalysis underlies Charles Taylor’s rejection of Parfit’s account of 
personal identity  and his claim that the account has a “fatal flaw” (Sources of the Self,
49). For Taylor criticises Parfit’s account of personal identity  as peculiarly  wholly 
lacking in practical content and failing to exist in a space of any essential framework 
of moral questions. It fails to be an identity that helps us orientated ourselves in the 
world. Firstly, I believe that  Taylor is wrong about  Parfit’s account being lacking in 
such ethical content. It answers precisely to the ethical question, “what is it that 
makes me the same being over time that has my actions rightly attributed to me?” 
However, he is right to say that it fails to take other kinds of ethical questions into 
account. Again, this would not be taken to be a significant criticism of Parfit’s account 
under my general taxonomy, for it would just be the case that Parfit’s account  of 
identity  is not intended to answer these other ethical questions. By my  distinction, 
Parfit-like accounts are still valuable as accounts of personal identity, if not workable 
as accounts of practical identity. Being able to distinguish between personal and 
practical identity, I am thus able to preserve Taylor’s and Parfit’s concerns, without 
rejecting any one of the their accounts.
     Unsurprisingly, not making these distinctions have consequences for 
understanding accounts of narrative identity  as well. For example, while David 
DeGrazia is sympathetic to narrative identity and argues for its value, his 
understanding of identity  without my distinctions goes on to make narrative identity 
rather superfluous. For DeGrazia’s claim is that narrative identity is sufficient to 
indicate personal identity, but what gets us this sufficiency is not the narrative itself, 
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but rather that a narrative fairly reliably  tracks mental features that make up personal 
identity. Narrative identity, for DeGrazia, is our self-understanding in a meaningful 
self-narrative form, which helps us orientate ourselves in the world. Narrative identity 
indicates personal identity because our narrative connects up a coherent mentally 
continuous being. However, DeGrazia argues that  we cannot give self-narratives 
unless we already have a self - we cannot exist as narrative beings unless we first 
exist. So underlying the narrative being must be a numerically-identical being, and 
each narrative being maps one-to-one with a numerically-identical being of mental 
features. It is this being that is necessary and sufficient for identity, in DeGrazia’s 
understanding (Human Identity and Bioethics, 75-114). What a narrative does is track 
the presence of this underlying identity. Hence, other than explaining why we 
commonsensically take narrative identity  to be an indicator of personal identity, the 
narrative itself is superfluous, and is not itself an important mode of selfhood. The 
superfluity only  holds if we take the purposes of identity-claims to merely  capture the 
ethical concerns of personal identity. If we are concerned with agential or practical 
identity, then it  would no longer be the case. Hence, making the distinction that I do 
generates a greater role for narrative identity to play in establishing our identity.
     It  should also be noted that  DeGrazia’s argument, that narrative identity 
presupposes numerical identity, depends on an understanding of identity without my 
distinctions. It is with the ethical concerns of personal identity that numerical identity 
is of import. Yet, if we do away with these concerns, and for example focus only on 
the concerns of practical identity, we can develop an account of narrative identity  that 
does not  presupposes numerical identity. For the “I” in the question of “how should I 
act” no longer needs to prefer to a numerically singular entity. One’s narrative identity 
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as a practical identity can span over several individuals, bearers of numerically 
identical identity. Hence, the distinction between personal and practical identity bring 
to light new ways of talking about narratives with regard to our practical, ethical 
selves.
     My making the distinction between different kinds of identity  also generates new 
ways of being critical of existing accounts of narrative identity. For example, it 
weakens David Velleman defence of narrative identity  against objections by Daniel 
Dennett (“The Self as Narrator”, 203-223). Dennett’s claim is that narratives serve no 
agential function - they do not play a primary motivating role in bringing about our 
actions. Instead, he claims, we are motivated to action by other mechanisms, and 
narratives are concocted after we are already motivated, so providing a post-hoc story 
of our actions. Velleman disputes this by giving evidence of how our self-descriptions 
in narratives generate value, and these values then give us directions and primarily 
motivates us to some action. Narrators are then loci of control (221). However, given 
my distinctions, just because a narrative gives us a sense of our practical selves in the 
world does not mean that it serves an agential function any more than it  possibly 
giving us a sense of having personal identity. For narrative identity as practical or 
personal identity is distinct from narrative identity as agential identity. Hence, 
Velleman cannot  draw upon narratives as serving a function of practical identity to 
claim that it serves an agential role as well. This is not to say  that Velleman is not 
correct in claiming that narratives play a part in our agency, but he has to find other 
reasons for thinking that it does. He has to appeal to evidence other than its role in 
giving us a practical identity  in order to refute Dennett’s claim of narratives being 
post-hoc accounts with regards to our agency. Hence, distinguishing between agential 
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and practical identity gives us new resources to analyse existing accounts of narrative 
identity. For it no longer takes as central a link between autonomy and all forms of 
identity.
Autonomy and Identity
     As I have already noted, the centrality  of autonomy and self-direction in some 
accounts of identity have led to misdirected criticisms of accounts of personal identity 
that are not configured to handle issues of autonomy. Instead, issues of autonomy are 
dealt with by  accounts of agential identity. However, the centrality  of autonomy and 
self-direction mistakenly constrains the manner in which practical identity  is 
configured in some accounts as well. For practical identity  involves the identities we 
take up to orientate ourselves to the world - giving us our values and reasons for 
acting in the world. A focus on autonomy leads to an assumption that the only reasons 
for acting and only things we value are the reasons and values we autonomously 
endorse, and so constrains the variety of practical identities we can and do have.
     It is this general feature that further distinguishes my account  from Korsgaard’s 
account of practical identity. Korsgaard’s account of practical identity  is wholly first-
personal and self-centric. She introduces her account  by means of addressing 
someone who is looking for a reason to be good rather than bad. In other words, she 
offers an account to someone who is looking for self-direction. For her, identity 
accounts are first-personal accounts. It is only in such a guise that her objections to 
Parfit make sense since Parfit’s account is not one configured to answer questions of 
autonomous action. This is not to say that such accounts of identity are without 
external guidelines and that we can identify ourselves to ourselves in any which way 
we want. For, as already  noted, Korsgaard’s account of reasons as fundamentally 
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being shared means that  the terms under which we give our account of identity must 
be shareable terms. Nonetheless, what makes up content of identity  is entirely 
determined by the first-personal author of his own identity. The ultimate authority  and 
valuer of the content of one’s practical identity is, in Korsgaard’s account, the 
autonomous will itself, with the only constraint being that his values must  be 
shareable and communicable with all other autonomous agents. In contrast, my 
account is not fundamentally self-directed and takes the conferrer of one’s practical 
identity to possibly coming from without oneself.
     This general feature of practical identity  also shows up more particularly in the 
other accounts of narrative identity. It is often assumed that the narrator of narrative 
identity  is always oneself, and that what is wholly  important is one’s self-narrative. 
For the importance of a narrative is assumed to be that of its role in self-direction. We 
tell a narrative in order to determine for ourselves what it is that we have most reason 
to do, and it is assumed that whatever reasons we have to act on must come from 
ourselves. Again, it is this bias of autonomy that places one’s own acting and valuing 
capacity as being of fundamental importance that drives this assumption. So 
DeGrazia, Velleman, Taylor and Ricoeur all take the self as narrator as being the only 
kind of narrator of import in their accounts of narrative identity. 
     The centrality of autonomy in these accounts of narrative identity  places certain 
bounds upon the accounts. For given that  the point of a narrative identity is for self-
direction, the limits of the narrative being told of our identity is bound by  the limits of 
what we can reasonably expect to have within our direct control. Our narrative 
identities do not extend outside of these bounds. Already discussed is DeGrazia’s 
view of narrative identity presupposing an underlying numerical identity. It  should be 
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clear that the centrality of autonomy informs such a view. DeGrazia’s narrative 
identity  is then bound to the life of a single autonomous subject. Similar to this 
consequence is Taylor’s view that what bounds a single narrative identity is the a 
priori unity of a single human life from childhood to death (51). For Taylor, your life 
story begins when you are born and ends when you die. Presumably, this is because of 
the bounds of your own body  in our commonsensical understanding of action and 
activity, and such a human life cycle is bound to such a body. For Taylor, whatever 
narrative we tell, the narrative makes sense of our identity within this defined life 
cycle. Velleman, who holds that our life is not made out of a single overarching 
narrative but made up of “small disconnected stories about ourselves” presupposes 
these narratives to take place within an overarching agential unity and not extending 
across agents. (“The Self as Narrator”, 223). Finally, Ricoeur argues that the purpose 
of a narrative is precisely  to give a unity to the different ways that an agent conceives 
of his identity  and so has it bound within a single autonomous agent as well. Although 
he is more able to admit that there seems to be no real narrative beginning or ending 
in life, he then goes on to say  that it is precisely through a fictive narrative account 
that we place the bounds of birth and death upon the sense of a life (162). In all of 
these accounts, an assumption of autonomous agency bounds the narrative, which I do 
not assume in my view.
     As an account of practical identity, I do not think that it  is necessary to have our 
narrative identity bound within our agency. For the narratives that give value to our 
lives need not be narratives that emerge from our own reflections as agents. By my 
account, we are born into stories and we adopt the stories we live in. We have 
accounts not only because we are called to give them and modify them not only 
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because we are asked to justify  them. We are also given our life stories right from the 
start, even before we are born, as they  are often not told by us alone and our birth is 
tied into the narrative of someone else. And our narrative identities continue even 
after our death, for our value and significance in the life of others and our 
environment extends beyond our individual selves. Furthermore, our individual 
narrative voice is not a final authority on our practical identity, like the voice of the 
autonomous will in Korsgaard’s account, but only one voice amongst many narrators. 
Each of these voices, including our own, have some authority  and we must negotiate 
with them seriously.
Narratives, Identity and Unity
     Having made distinctions of identity and argued for the non-necessity  of them to 
refer to the same being for the sake of autonomous self-control, I also argue that there 
is no need for a single account of identity to capture all the distinctions made by  the 
three ethical questions. By not making the distinctions, each of these other ethical 
accounts of identity  implicitly  make such a claim. Only such an assumption allows 
Korsgaard to make her analysis of moral identity (agential identity) as a necessary 
practical identity. It is what allows DeGrazia to argue that numerical identity and 
narrative identity are same in kind, and that the latter presupposes the former. It is 
what allows Frankfurt to make the moves that I discussed in Chapter 1. In my way  of 
accounting, I do not assume that there is a need to integrate the distinctions back into 
a common account of identity.
     Lacking this difference in intention leads to a different account and role for 
narrative identity. For in my account, narrative identities are practical identities. We 
have a multiplicity  of them and each of these give us, sometimes conflicting, ethical 
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direction. However, each narrative is thick and meaningful, taking into consideration 
social roles, character and overall understanding in a larger plot. So it is still different 
from Velleman’s understanding of narrative, which involves just causal self-
descriptions behind each of our actions. For Velleman, our eating a meal or answering 
a phone or scratching an itch count as small narratives, since he is only interested in 
narratives being what drives actions, even small ones (“The Self as Narrator”, 222). In 
my view, these actions lack sufficient significance to count even as a plot, let alone a 
narrative. After all, in any novel, these events are not normally of significance unless 
embedded within a larger narrative context. Nevertheless, I do not go so far in the 
other direction to conceive of the only  valuable narratives being that of a single life 
narrative. Given that I already reject bounds of autonomy or a single human life, there 
is no reason why I should take this to be the case.
     In this manner, I also differ from Paul Ricoeur’s role of the narrative. For Ricoeur, 
the point of a narrative identity is to integrate the various dimensions of selfhood back 
into a single coherent whole. The point of a narrative is to hold together the various 
identities answered by various ethical demands within a single being. Narratives thus 
play  an integrative function and a narrative identity  is the identity  crafted of a single 
human life. As he notes, “the specific model of interconnection of events constituted 
by emplotment allows us to integrate with permanence in time what seems to be its 
contrary  in the domain of sameness-identity, namely  diversity, variability, 
discontinuity  and instability” (140). He also writes that “narrative identity makes the 
two ends of the chain link up with one another: the permanence of time of character 
and that of self-constancy [i.e. the manner of self-conducting such that  we can be held 
accountable by others]” (166). For Ricoeur, the role of narrative is not mere action-
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guidance, but serves to unify  the various threads of ethical identity  into a single 
identity account.
     In my account, such comprehensive unity is not necessary. While we could do so, I 
believe that  doing so closes off many practical dimensions of self-conception and 
restrains us unnecessarily - as I have argued Frankfurt’s account to possibly do. A 
narrative account, I believe, is best served if it does not have to explain everything all 
of the time, for it  would then give us more room for originality  and creativity without 
closing off various directions our self-conceptions can take beforehand. Furthermore, 
the division of our practical identity  into various narrative identities allows us to see 
more clearly  the different bonds we have with ourselves and with others. For while 
Ricouer too admits of the intermingling  and entanglement of life histories, his 
resolution seems to be the conclusion of one single gargantuan narrative incorporating 
the lives of all those involved; something that he compares to the competing visions 
of the various protagonists in a single novel (162). Such a view leaves little space for 
the parts of our narrative that need not bear the comment of others. Furthermore, it 
reduces the value of our selves as authors of our own narratives, for now we write 
only a part of a much more massive story, rather than serve as a central narrator (160). 
A less comprehensive narrative vision of identity allows us more practical room for 
ethical deliberation by  removing the need to integrate every single one of our 
narratives into a larger one. This is not to say  that we need not sometimes do so, 
especially when our narratives do overlap and compete and come into conflict, but 
these are more the exception than the norm.
     Ultimately, the difference between my account and other accounts of identity  in 
general, and narrative identity  in particular, involves denying the need to discover a 
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single unitary self that then directs our ethical enquiry. In my  account, I begin with 
various enquiries and from these enquiries generate different selves that best answer 
the questions of the enquiry. These selves require no further integration back into a 
single self. In contrast, other accounts of identity begin with determining what a self 
is, and then from that self goes forth to handle different ethical demands. In my 
account of narrative identity, such an identity only deals with the practical self and so 
need not be comprehensive in capture other senses in which we use the term ‘self’. In 
contrast, other accounts of narrative identity needs to be consistent with a variety of 
demands made by a single unitary self and tends to be comprehensive. Having made 
all of these distinction, I must end by admitting that I can offer no necessary  reason 
why my account would be the better one. I can urge that we look at the different 
approaches and decide which is the story that we want to tell.
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